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ABSTRACT:Forward commitments to lend at predetermined rates
and times account for large fractions of the investments of major
institutional lenders. When the commitments are made, both the flow
of future investible funds, and the forgone returns on alternative future
investments, are uncertain. This paper systematically analyzes the
impacts of these uncertainties on optimal portfolios including forward
commitments when investors have either constant absolute or constant
proportional riskaveisiori. This analysis of the supply of forward
commitments is supplemented by a corresponding model of the de-
mand for forward commitments by risk-averse issuers of claims; and
the competitive equilibrium rate on forward commitments is derived.
¶ Itis shown that under realistic assumptions equilibrium rates on
forward commitments will be higher than the expected future market
rate for immediate investment at takedown timeand this is true even
in the limiting case of purely competitive forsvard commitment mar-
kets. Even though lenders avoid uncertainty of return on the funds
committed forward, commitment rates higher than either currentor
expected future market rates are not prima facie evidence of market
power per se. Even when allassessments are made in terms of
NOTE:This paper i, part 01 a National Bureau of Economic Research study of the effects of inflationon
financial markets that has been funded by the American co'jncil of Life Insurance. Helpful commentson an
earlier version of this paper were made by Phillip Cagan, Kenneth M. Wright, Jay 0. Light, and Benjamin
M. Friedman, and by members of the NBER staff reading committee: Charles R. wolf, Lawrence 0. Jones,
and Donald E. Fairar. My appreciation also goes to the members of the NBER Board reading committee: Eli
Shapiro, James J. O'leary, and Henri Theil. Stephen 5. Smith helpfully checked the mathematics.
445symmetrical probab;hty distributions, skewness preferences are intro-
duced by lenders' concern with new-money rates, and these are shown
to reinforce the results of simpler models. Further implications of
lenders' concerned with relative new-money rates (i.e., their own versus
those realized by their competitors) are also briefly considered.
A forward commitment is a binding agreement by a lending institution to
make available a given amount of funds upon given credit terms at certain
specified dates in the future. (See O'Leary 1960,p. 325; also see other
references cited in the review of the literature on forward commitments,
below.) Normally, the conimitment agreement specifies the interestrate,
maturity, redemption privileges, and so on, as well as the schedule of
disbursement or "takedown" of the funds. The forward commitmentis
binding on the lender, and the borrower is also obligatedto take down the
funds in the agreed amounts: The latter feature distinguishesforward
commitments from the "lines of credit"common in commercial bank
lending which merely give the potential borrowera "call" upon any
amount of credit up to a stated maximum at any timeover a specified
period. Also in recent years, such lines of creditas well as the longer-term
loans of commercial banks have often specified floatingrates that vary with
changes in the prime or some other baserate.In contrast, forward
commitments typically are made at fixed contractualrates of interest
determined at the time the commitment is made ratherthan at the later
time when the funds are drawn down.
Forward commitments as here definedare important features of the
lending of mutual savings banks, savings and loanassociations (S&L's), and
lifeinsurance companies on residential,industrial,and commercial
mortgages; and they are an essential feature of lendingin the so-called
private placement market for corporate securities.The importance of the
distinction between forward contracts andspot transactions in analyzing
the investment behavior of each of theselending institutions and invest-
ment markets depends upon the length of the commitmentinvolved, which
in turn of course depends significantlyon the type of investment and
whether new constructionis involved. Advance commitmentsto take
down some part ofa new underwritten issue of corporate bondsor to write
a mortgage on existing homes will typicallyinvolve only a few daysor
weeks. In contrast, mortgagecommitments to lend on new homesmust
cover the construction period and will normallyrun from six to twelve
months; those on apartments,condominiums, shopping centers, office
buildings, industrial plants, andso on will often run as long as twoor three
years, and sometimes longer.
The typical savings and loanassociation has always (except, ofcourse,
during and right after WorldWar II) invested 90percent or more of its
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assets in esidential rriortgage loans. The concentration of this lendingon
one-to-four--family houses and the large fraction of such lendingon
existing properties makes the weighted average of the forward commitment
period relatively short (one to two months or less) for most S&Ls, although
it has become somewhat longer for some of the largerones in large cities
in recent years during periods of heavy construction ofnew apartment
buildings. While mutual savings banks typically investa somewhat smaller
fraction (60-70 percent) of their assetsin residential mortgages, their
lending practices are similar and their weightedaverage commitment
periods for these loans are about as short as for S&Ls. Themean commit-
ment period for the largest savings banks will again be somewhat longer
because of their mortgage lending on commercial and industrial properties
as well as their loans on multifamily structures.
The weighted average of the forward commitment period for lifeinsur-
ance companies will be very substantially longer than for either mutual
savings banks or S&Ls. Over the last two decades, home mortgages have
progressively declined to a small fraction of all the mortgage commitments
made by insurance companies.2 A very high fraction of theircommitments
for mortgages on income properties has been for 'takeout"mortgages
granted upon the completion of new construction typically involvingtwo
years or more before final takedown, and large fractions of their commit-
ments in private placements involve equally long lead times. Bonds and
mortgages dominate the investment portfolios of life insurance companies,
and at least since 1961, ALIA data show that bonds andmortgages
acquired through forward commitments have averagedover 95 percent of
all such acquisitions.
When such large fractions of all new investments involve advance
commitments for later delivery of funds at rates determined at the time of
the commitment rather than delivery, inyestmentmanagers have a primary
responsibility to act on their best judgment that the fundsso placed are
prudently invested in this way rather than in alternative investment outlets
available for immediate purchase at the future delivery date. The latterspot
market yields will of coLrce not be known until the latter time, but the
decision must nevertheless be made now when the yieldon the relevant
alternative investment outlet is still uncertain. Managements'assessments
(made at the time of the commitment) of the relevant spot rates that will be
available when the funds are to be actually paid outmust be an essential
factor in the determination of the desirable scale of forward commitments
for every institution investing in these markets. The only possible exception
would be a small savings bank or savings and loan association ina small
town with no new construction whose mortgage lending is confined to
loans for the transfer of existing houses. Even in this limitingcase, there
would be some uncertain movement in the spot rateson alternative marketinvestments over the few days orso between the times of the commitments
and the payouts of the fundson the new loans. But for all savings banks
and savings and loan associations that lendon new, single-family construc-
tion, assessments of spot marketrates at least six months in the future will
be involvedand for larger savingsinstitutions and life insurancecorn-
panies that lend on new multifamilyresidential and commercialor other
'income" properties and in theprivate placement market, the lead time of
assessment of the opportunity cost ofany commitment at currently deter-
mined rates is several times longer.
Since as a general rule theuncertainty regarding any assessment in-
creases with its futurity, we shouldexpect that the variance of theassess-
ment of the future spot rates relevantto lending on new income properties
would be greater thanon new small residential construction, and doubly
greater than on loans for the transferof existing homes. Moreover, witha given degree of riskaversion, modern portfolio andinvestment theory
would correspondinglysuggest that the assessments of probablefuture
market interest rates and theiruncertainties would play an essential rolein the investment decisionsof all institutional investors,with the possible
exception of the smallest banksas a limiting case, and that the roleof future market rates wouldbe relatively greateron average for most life
insurance companies than foreven large savings banksor S&Ls.
Remarkably enough,a review of the literature indicatesthat there has been no systematictheoretical analysis of theextent to which investing
institutions shouldvary the scale of their forwardcommitments at any given current commitmentrates on the basis of theirassessments of the expected values andvariances of future marketrates. There have indeed been severalrecent studies of the forwardcommitment behavior of institu- tional investors.In particular, jaffee(1972) has analyzed theforward commitments for residentialmortgages made by niutualsavings banks, savings and loanassociations, and life insurancecompanies; and Bisig- nano (1971), Pesando (1971),and Ribble (1973) havestudied the forward commitments of insurancecompanies, broken down bytype of property on loan underlying thecommitment. In each of thesefour studies, thenow relatively standardstock-adjustment model is adoptedto explain forward commitments in terms of cashflows and discrepanciesbetween actual and desired stocks of eachtype of investment. Desiredfuture holdings ofeach asset (for instance, incomeproperty mortgages) in dollarsis made a linear function ofconcurrent yield spreadsagainst other assets.Neither the expected value of thedifference between thecurrent commitment rate and the future (takedowntime) rate on thealternative use 01 the funds,nor the variance of thisassessment enters into theanalysis in these studies.More recently, Fleuriet (1975),in the course ofa study of changes in thespread between rateson public and privateofferings of debt issues,finds that the
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linearly (and significantly) related to the dollar amounts of their investible
funds, the current rate on commitments, and the forward rate implicit in
the yield curve; but this primarily empirical study did not carefully develop
the underlying theory.3
The primary purpose of the present paper is to fill in the analysis of the
impact of assessments of uncertain future market rates and the stochastic
properties of flows of investible funds upon the optimal forward commit-
ment positions of major institutional investors. A larger companion study
(Lintner, Piper, Fortune 1976) fills out the institutional, empirical, and
econometric analysis of forward commitment positions with particular
reference to life insurance companies.
Specifically, this paper develops a theoretical analysis of the impact of
interest rate expectations upon forward commitments by examining the
behavior of a single lender who must determine the appropriate amounts of
funds to commit for future takedown in the face of uncertainty about what
relevant future interest rates and future investible funds will turn out to be
at the time the committed funds are disbursed. To keep theseessential
elements in the clearest possible focus,Isimplify the general forward
commitment problem by supposing (i) that only one type of assetis
available for future commitments and (ii) that there is a given and fixed
time period of months after the initial commitment is made before the
funds are disbursed.In order to highlight the effects of uncertainties
regarding future market interest rates (and the amount of funds available for
investment),I also assume initially that (iii) the interest rate (re) at which
commitments may be made is given by the market and does not depend on
the volume of commitments any one company decides to undertake.5
In particular,I concentrate on the investment decision of a particular
institutional investor which expects to have F funds available for invest-
ment r months hence. At the present time, the company can make a
forward commitment to deliver some or all of these funds at a known and
fixed rate (re), but ifit commits $C forward, it will have to invest the
remaining funds ($F - $C) available 7 months from now at whatever the
current market rate (?) on the relevant alternative (future) "spot" investment
turns out to be at that time.6 The decision regarding the amount of forward
commitments (C) must be made now, even though the alternative market
rate (i)and usually also the total amount of available funds () for
investmentwill not be known until r months later.
It is assumed throughout this theoretical analysis that each management
has a risk-averse preference ordering over different combinations of risks
and returns, and that it chooses the particular level of its forward commit-
ments to obtain the combination of risk-and-return characteristics it prefers
to those associated with any other investment posture available. In field
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interesting differences were uncovered in the identificationof the returns
concerning which investing institutionswere behaving in a risk-averse
manner. Some considerable support was foundamong savings banks and
insurance companies for identifying thesereturns with (i) the amount of
income (or the level of the incomestream) produced by the investments
made. More generally, however, thisfield work indicated that these
managements were primarily concerned with (ii) therate of returnthe
"new-money rate"obtairiedon the investment funds disbursed atany
given time. There was also substantialevidence that several insurance
companies with relatively large sales ofgroup insurance were giving a
heavy weight to measures of(iii) their relative performance_i.e., theirown
rate of return in comparison with thatrealized by other companies.7
In section 1,I analyze the supply of forwardcommitments from institu-
tional lenders that are riskaverse with respect to the level of theincome
stream provided by the investmentsmade. This simple model readilylends itself to a rather transparentanalysis of the effects of severalimportant features of commitmentmarkets, including equilibriumcommitment rates in purely competitive marketsof risk-averse borrowers andlenders. In section 2, all the precedingqualitative results for lenders'behavior are
re-established on the assumption thatlenders act in terms ofrates of return on the basis of preference functionsexhibiting constantproportional risk aversion, and I also establish therelevance andconsequences of "skew-
ness preference" when investorsare concerned with rate of returnon uncertain flows of investible funds.In section 3,Idevelop additional implications of lenders'concern with relative rate-of-returnperformance criteria.
It will be useful tosummarize the principal conclusionsreached before the more detailedanalysis is presented. Inparticular, when thecontract yield on commitmentsis known but the marketrate on the relevant
alternative asset at the timeof takedown isuncertain, the following analysis
establishes that:
If the amount ofinvestible funds were knownahead of time, risk-averse institutionalinvestors using eitheran investment incomeor
new-moneyrate performance criterionwould undertaketo be fully committed forward even if theexpected future marketrate were as high as the rate availableon commitments







strong) inverse relation between future investihle funds and changes in
the market rate always reduces the forward commitment position that
would otherwise be optimal. Indeed, with both criteria, (C) a given
degree of negative covariance reduces the optimal commitments more
sharply the higher the level of market rates.
Other things equal, optimal forward commitment positions vary
directly with the rate (re) (including fees) on forward commitments and
inversely with changes in the level of the expected market rate (F).In
both respects, however, the extent of the adjustment in forward com-
mitment positions as a result of any change in rorwill be smaller, the
more risk averse the lender and the greater the uncertainty inits
assessment of the future market rate.
In view of (ii) and (iii) above, institutional lenders risk averse with
respect to either their levels of investment income as such or thelevels of
their new-money rates will choose a high ratio of forward commitments
to their expected investible funds only if commitment rates arehigher
than expected market rates at takedown time. Moreover, to support a
given commitment ratio of say 90 percent or so, this positive "commit-
ment premium" will have to be larger: (a) the greater their uncertainty
regarding market rates,(b) the greater the (negative) dependence of
investible funds on movements in interest rates, (c) the greater their risk
aversion; and also (assuming the appropriate covariance is stable), (d)
the higher the level of interest rates.
Comment:These conclusions are particularly important because
they show that under empirically relevant assumptions we should
observe commitment rates higher than expected (or current) market
rates (for direct investment) even if forward commitment markets were
purely competitive in the strictest and most ideal sense and no lender
had any "market power" whatsoever. The fact that commitment rates
have been considerably higher than current market rates is not in itself
prima facie evidence of market power. (In this connection, recall that
ALIA data show that life insurance companies since 1961 have been
acquiring mere than 90 percent of their long-term assets through
forward commitments.)
The above results follow from mean-variance portfolio theory
based on the assumption of symmetric probability distributions. But
when the amount of investible funds is ex ante a stochastic variable
negatively correlated with the uncertain future market rate, the new-
money rate (defined as the ratio of incomeproduced to the actual
amount invested) has a negatively skewed distribution even whenboth
the numerator and denominator are symmetrically distributed. Also, this
negative skewness will be increased by any penalty costs associatedwith
shortfalls of investible funds below prior commitments. Institutional
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averse to negative skewnesswill, consequently, have a lower forward
commitment position, ceteris paribus, than those who are merely risk-
averse in a mean-variance context.9 As a corollary, it also follows that
when such lenders act on the basis of preferences over new-money rates,
the excess of commitment rates over expected market rates observed in
purely competitive markets will be larger the more prevalent and intense
the lenders' aversion to downside skewness.
vi.In section 3,it is established that companies that are risk-averse
with respect to relative new-money rates'°as the measure of their
investment performance will tend to be relatively less heavilycommitted
forward than their major competitors unlesscommitment rates are
sufficiently higher than expected market rates. Theamount of "commit-
ment premium" required to bring their forward commitmentposition up
to their competitors' will be larger (a) the greater theiruncertainty over
interest rate movements, (b) the stronger thenegative covariance be-
tween interest rate movements and their flows ofinvestible funds, (c) the
more intense their aversion to risk and uncertainty, and (d)the 8reater
their dislike of negative skewnessin the distribution of relativenew-
money rates.
In the companion manuscript (Lintner,Piper, Fortune 1976), it is estab-
lished that each of these effects ofinterest rate expectations and uncertain-
ties, derived here in the simplecontext of a one-period model, continue to
hold in the more general andrealistic context of a multiperiod, stock-
adjustment model of the forwardcommitment process. In that manuscript it
is also established that the resultsderived here on the assumption that only
one asset is available for forwardcommitment carry over to total forward
commitments of an institution and to itscommitments in each type of asset
subject to forward commitment(different types of mortgages andprivate
placements).
11] INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORSRISK AVERSE WITI-$
RESPECT TO INVESTMENTINCOME
It is assumed that
management uses its assessments of the basicuncertain- ties of its investment situationto form estimates of theexpected returns and risks which would beassociated with any possible levelof future commit-
ments (C)it might choose to undertake,and that the particular levelof forward commitments (Ct)it chooses is theone that in its judgment has the
preferred combination ofrisk-and-return characteristics.In this section, it is
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assumed that the institution acts in terms of a risk-averse pelerence
ordering (or "utility function") over the possible outcomes of its decisions
which depend essentially on the stream of investment income (or on the
rates of return) associated with the different possible decisions it may take.
Without loss of generality for present purposes, it can also be assumed that
risks are adequately indexed by the variances of the uncertain outcomes,
i.e., that all stochastic variables are normally distributed.
Formally, the forward commitment decision problem is analyzed in the
context of a standard mean-variance model of portfolio theory. The list of
variables used is defined as follows:
Fthe cash flow thatwillbe available for investment T
months in the future. (When this term is uncertain at the
time the decision is made, itis written as F.)
the rate of interest currently available on funds committed
now for delivery at the time r months from now.
Fthe uncertain rate at which funds for immediate delivery
may be invested r months from now.
Cthe amount of funds committed now for forward delivery T
months from now.
Ythe sizeoftheinvestment income streamproduced,
beginning at time r, by the current decision regarding for-
ward commitments.
V. i Fthe expected value5 of the indicated variables.
V1, Vr, Vthe variances of the indicated variables.
FN(i Vr) and F = N(F, Vs).
grp'the covariance between F and F.
U(Y)the utility function of the lending institution that exhibits
riskaversion,i.e.,U'(Y)= aU/aY > 0 andU"(Y)
= a2U/aY2 < 0.
Given management's assessments of the underlying uncertainties in
interest rates (F) and funds (h, each possible choice of a level of forward
commitments (C) will be associated with a different distribution of invest-
ment income 0'), and the optimal choice (C*) can be found by choosing C
to maximize E(U(Y)]. But it is well known that with normally distributed
random elements the effort to maximize E(U(Y)1 is strictly equivalent as a
decision criterion to the simpler
(1.1)criterion: choose C to maximize W(Y, V)
where the welfare index W(Y, V) is
(1.2) W = V - yV/2e
(1.3)y = - > 0
is the measure of the investor'sdegree of risk aversion, whichwas first
suggestedin the pioneering work ofPratt (1964) and Arrow (1965).
More-risk-averse investors have largervalues ofv and require larger
increments of expectedreturn to justify (on the basis oftheir subjective
preferences) any action thatincreases the variance ("risk") ofthe distribu- tion of their income. Althoughthe degree of risk aversiongenerally varies
somewhat with the level of income,the effects of any suchvariations on the level of forwardcommitments are of secondaryimportance and small relative to the otherconsideratiorls that will be emphasized.Consequently, for convenience itreat the risk-aversionparameter as a constant forany given institution,even though different institutionswill be more or less risk averse.





To illustrate the solutionin the simplest possiblesituation, I first consider the decision thatwould be made if the levelof F were known inadvance. This case will alsoserve as a benchmark to bringout most explicitly the impact of uncertaintiesabout the supply ofinvestihle funds (introducedin section 1.2 below).
[1.1) The CommitmentDecision When Fk Not Uncertain
When F, the totalamount of investment fundsavailable for deliveryat time r, is known in advance, theonly uncertaintyinvolves the interestrate on spot investment at timeT. The uncertain investmentincome which will be realized by a totalinvestment of $F, with$C committed inadvance, will thus be
(1.5)V = Cr + (FC)F;
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and vhereand the expected values and variance ofare respectively
(1.6)V = Cr-f (F - C)?,
and
(1.7)V (FC)2Vr.
When (1.6) and (1.7) are differentiated, and the resultsare substituted into
(1.4),itis found that the optimal level of C must satisfy
(1.8) 1c?+y(FC)Vr_0.
The general solution for the optimal level of C (denotedCt) is given by
r - (1.9) Ct=F+
yVr
when (i) the total amount of funds (F) that will be available forinvestment
is known in advance, and (ii) the rate (re) availableon new commitments is
given and does not depend on the amount of commitments madeby the
given company, and (iii) the interest rate that will be availableon direct
investments in the future is uncertain.
Within its relevant range,11 equation 1.9 shows,as expected, that the
supply of forward commitments varies directly with the commitmentrate
(re) and inversely with the expected future alternative rate fl. Moreover, in
both respects, the absolute rate ofresponse in the volume of commitments
is inversely proportional to both risk aversion and the uncertainty of the
interest rate forecast. But equation 1.9 also establishes the important
conclusion [(i) in the Introductioni that even when the expected value of
the uncertain return on future direct investments isas high as the current
forward commitment rate,'2 companies actingas if they were sure of the
amount of funds they will have available at takedown time (but uncertain
of the market rates which will be available at that time) will make forward
commitments equal to the (known) amount of their available funds (Ct =
F). If a risk-averse institutional lender knew F in advance, it would be fully
invested in commitments wheneverr ? because the rate on forward
commitments is a known value while the certainty equivalent of the
uncertain future market rate is less than its expected value in theassess-
ment of all risk averters. Under such favorable conditions a "fully commit-
ted investment policy" is a consequence of theconcern of risk-averse
lenders with the expected level and uncertainty of futurerates on alterna-
tive investments.13
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[1.2] The Commitment Decision When theSupply of Investible
Funds Is Uncertain (with No Penaltiesfor Shortfalls)
When the total amount of fundsthat will be available for deliveryat timei
is also uncertain, the randomamount of investment income which willbe realized from a total investmentof $F, including K committedin advance, will be
(1.5a) Y=Cr+(F_c)j
In the present subsection,I assume for simplicity thatthe same rate F
represents both (i) the relevant future yieldthat will be available in thespot market for any excess ofavailable funds (F)over prior commitments c and (ii) the yield givenup on sales of previously acquiredassets (or the rate paid on new borrowing)to cover any excess ofC over the flow of investible funds (r) whichbecome availableat takedown time,r periods hence. Suchan assumption of equal borrowingand lending ratesis common in theoretical workon capital markets and yieldssignificant results in the presentinstance, even though in thecontext of commitment
markets represents onlya rather special limitingcase. The effects of "penalty costs" forshortfalls (F < C) will beanalyzed in subsection1.4 below.




Now it can be showfll4that the covarianceof the producti with F itself can be simplified to
= ropr+FVr,
with the result that(l.7a) reducesisto
(1.7b)V1(C1 - 2CF)Vr2CFcJFr + VFr.
Proceeding as before,differentiating (l.6a) and(1.7b) and substitutingthese results into (1.4),we find that the optimallevel of Cmust now satisfy
(1.8a)rF - )'(C- F)Vr + YTO.r = 0.
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Since the first two terms of (1 .9a) are the same as those in (1.9), the set of
conclusions in point iii of the Introduction is again confirmed. Moreover,
even when the amount of investible funds is uncertain but rio penalty costs
are involved in shortfalls, institutional investors that are risk-averse op-
timizers of the income streams produced by their investments will still
follow a "fully committed investment policy" in making their forward
commitments (i.e., C = F) unless they expect future "opportunity cost"
rates to be higher than the rates currently available on new commitments,
and provided they do not allow for (or expect) any association between
future levels of market rates and the amount of total funds they will have
for investment. Once again, under these favorable conditions, a "lull
investment" operating policy follows from their risk-averse objective of
optimizing the returns on their investments.
The third term of (l.9a) may he written in two equivalent alternative
forms which have interesting interpretations, First, it should be noted that
the term Uf,r/Vr is just the slope coefficient in a least squares regression of
the amount of investible funds (F) on the level of the market interest rate c?).




where be,. = Or/Vr. We also observe that bpr = oF/a?, with the result
that the elasticity (qfr) of expected funds relative to expected interest rates
is - (OF/F)/(a?/?) =ibFr/F. Again substituting, we have
(19c) C = (1 -pr)F +-
yVr
These equations clearly show that, even when there are no penalties in
investment income when shortfalls (F < C*) occur, uncertainties regarding
the amount of funds that will be available for investment will also produce
further adjustments in the level of forward commitments whenever man-
agement believes there is any negative association between higher or lower
interest rates and the amount of its investible funds. Such an association
will certainly be negative, i.e.,bFr < 0and qpT > 0, for several related
reasons. Lower interest rates will induce advance refunding of securities
originally floated at higher rates and stimulate accelerated repayments on
outstanding mortgages, both of which serve to increase the amount of
funds that must be reinvested when interest rates are low and particularly
when they are falling. This negative association carries through for both
savings institutions and insurance companies when rates are rising because
of the absence of these incremental inflows of funds. Moreover, when
interest rates are higher than the contradual rates on loans against insur-
ance policies, an increase in market rates will then lead to substantialincreases in the policy loans ofinsurance Companies, and theseprior
Claims serve to reduce, dollar fordollar, the pool of fundsotherwise
available for satisfying forwardcommitments or normal market investments
(O'Leary 1960; Lintner, Piper, Fortune1976). Correspondingly, highand rising market rates induce largeand increasing net outflowsof savings
deposits and withdrawals-_popularlytermed "disi ntermediation."Resu Its
of numerous econometric studiesstrongly confirm that each of theseeffects pioduces a negative associationbetween interest ratemovements and the
funds otherwise available forinvestment.
Our equations clearly show thatwhen commitment ratesjust match the
expected levels of future marketrates, i.e., when r = F, allowance forsuch
a negative association between interestrates and investible funds willlead
risk-averse income-maximizingcompanies to back off froma fully invested forward commitmentpolicy. Moreover, ifwe concentrate the formulation in equanon 1.9b,we see that the amount of "backingoff" will vary with the product of theexpected interest rate and the(negative) slope (bF) ofa regression of investible fundson the interest rate. Since b'rmeasures the expected number of dollarsF lost per unit of changein?, this product will be a large number forlarge institutions.Alternatively, wesee in (1.9c) that the optimal forwardcommitment position ofany lender, expressedas a fraction of its expectedinvestible funds (F), willvary inversely with the elasticity and econometricestimates show that inmany cases this elasticity rangesas high as 0.5 or 0.6)6
This analysis of theextent to which the volumeof forwardcommitments supplied by any lenderwill fall short of theamount of his expected investibje funds whenr,, = F provides one usefulbenchmark for the interpretation of this model.Another is provided bydefining thecommit- ment premium (r- F) as the excess of thecurrent rate on forward commitments over theexpected future rateon the appropriate alternative asset at takedown time.17We can determinethe commitmentp.emjum required to bring fortha volume of forwardcommitments equal to the volume of fundsexpected at takedown timeby setting C !in equations 1.9b and 1.9c andsolving forr- F.This gives usia
f+
(l.]Oa)r,, - I =YVr(?bpr)> 0 whenC*=
and
*+ (1.1Gb) r-_?+yVTfr>0 when C =
In both formulationswe have a generalproof that when (i)Suppliers are risk-averse, (ii)are uncertain regardingthe amount oftheir future investible funds, and (iii)allow fornegative covariancebetween such fundsand interest rates, thesupply of newforwardcommitments made will beas
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large as the expected volume of investiblefunds only if the yield on
forward commitments is greater than theexpected interest rate on open-
market purchases of long-term securitiesat the time of takedown.
[1.3] Equilibrium Commitment Premiums in Purely
Competitive Markets
The C in equations 1 .9b and 1 .9crepresents the total volume of forward
commitments a given lender would want to have outstandingat a given
time on the basis of the expected value (F) of theinvestible funds to be
available at the time of takedown and the valuesof the other parameters
and variables in the equation. It thusrepresents the supply of forward
commitments from a given institution, and byaggregation the same equa-
tion can be used to represent the supply of forwardcommitments from all
institutionallenders on the basis of givenassessments'9 of the other
variables. The supply of forward commitments fromany institutional lender
will be a rising function of the commitmentpremium, withits slope
inversely proportional to the product of the risk-aversioncoefficient and
the variance (uncertainty) of the futurerate. Summing over all lenders, the
aggregate supply of forward commitments will havea similar2o positive
slope of 1/yVr.
The aggregate demand for forwardcommitments will correspondingly
have a negative slope. For most developersof apartment houses, con-
dominiums, office buildings, shoppingcenters, and the like, obtaining an
advance guarantee of permanent "takeout"mortgage financing is usually
essential,21 not just a matter of convenienceor monetary advantage, and
similar considerations apply to the financing of theconstruction of single-
family houses.22 A declining (aggregate market)demand curve for such
forward commitments follows from theinverse relation (ex ante and other
things equal) between the net profitability ofthe operation of the com-
pleted property and its financing cost. With eachincrease in r, ceteris
paribus, more potential borrowers dropout of the market.
The rationale for the negatively sloped demandsof industrial and other
users of forward commitments can take two somewhat different forms
which can be sketched briefly. In the first form(admittedly not strictly
relevant in "perfect" capital markets),a potential borrower knows that he
will need a certain amount of fundsat some given time in the future;
arranging an advance commitment froma lender to provide the funds will
substantially reduce his risks that the fundsmay not be available when they
are needed because of credit rationing. Lane (1974) has shown thatin such
circumstances, the volume of forward commitment thatrisk-averse bor-
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rowers will want declines with increases in the cost ofcommitments.23 The
second (which does hold even in idealizedcompetitive markets) derives
from the insurance that forwardcommitments provide to risk-averse bor-
rowers against increases in market rates by the time thefunds are drawn
down. Let
Bamount of total borrowing required
C,amount of forward commitment obtained
ffruncertain rate on borrowing other than throughcommitments
uncertain rate of profit from use of funds beforefinancing costs
uncertain rate of profit after finance charges
Then
(1.11)11 'C(th re) + (B- Cd)(Iiji)
= B(th - ib) + Ca(ib - re).
The expected value ti)and variance (Va) of net profitsare then:
(1.12)fl= B(ff --b) + Cd(ib - r1.).
(1.13)V B2Vm...rb + Cjt/, + 2BCaor.,,,_r
= BVm + (8 - Cd)2Vr + 28(Ca- 13)ffmr.
Risk-averse borrowers willchoose Cd to maximize f[Udi)J,which by
familiar derivation is thevalue satisfying
(1.14)aE[1Jfl)]/aC0 =-- Yb[Btjmr - (BCa)Vr}
or
(1.15)CB - [(r,b)/YbVr]/3rir
where /3,,,,.= (7,nrlVr and yis the borrower's risk-aversionparameter.
Again, because of riskaversion, the demand for forwardcommitments (C) varies inversely with thecommitment rate. Since eachtype of demand for
forward commitments isnegatively inclined, theaggregate demand will also be a declining functionof the commitmentrate re,.
The preceding analysisof the supplies and demandsfor forwardcom- mitments may be combinedas illustrated in Figure 1, and theequilibrium rate rin a purely competitiveforward commitmentmarket will then be
given by the intersection of thesesupply and demandcurves. The position of these lines as drawnreflects (i) the proof, givenat the end of subsection
1.2, that the Scurve must be higher than iat the point above expected
investible funds (F), and(ii)the empirical fact thatthe commitment premium has remainedpositive in practice, whichimplies that the demand curve has to be high enoughto intersect the Scurve at a level above i. Over time the positionof the demandcurve will shift to the rightor left depending on businessconditions and changes inpotential borrower's
I
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mitments
ci C
NOTE:ris the market-clearing or equilibrium rate on forward commitments, and C is the dollar volume
relative to F. the aggregate expectation of ir.vestible funds.
needs for funds. Correspondingly, the position of the supply curve will shift
equally with changes over time in the expected volume of investible funds
F, as well as any changes in the current assessments of the other elements
in equations 1.9b or 1.9c. The empirical observation that commitment
premiums have remained positive over time25 indicates that throughout
their respective cyclical shifts to the right or the left, the position of the
demand and supply curves relative to each other has always involved an
intersection at which the market-clearing late on forward commitments (r)
exceeded the currently assessed expectation of the relevant future market
rate fr).
But independent of past shifts of demands relative to supplies, itis
particularly important to observe that rmust always lie on the supply
curve. We can consequently use equation 1.9b or 1.9c, or both, to
conclude further that for any given level of F, the commitment premium (r
?) required to draw forth any given volume of forward commitments (C)
will have to be algebraically larger
The more risk averse the companies;
The more uncertain the future interest rate;
The greater the negative covariance between changes in available
funds and changes in interest rates; and,
The higher the level of expected future interest rates.
Each of these changes in conditions or assessments, in other words, will
S
Interest Rate Expectations 461raise the heightof the supPlY curveof forward commitments (or, equiva
lently, move the Scurve to theleft).
Moreover, itfollows as a furthercorollary that even under idealize(J
conditions, in whichforward commitment markets would be purely com-
petitive in the strictestsense and rioindividual lender would haveany
market power whatsoever,we would nevertheless observe forward corn.
mitment rates higherthan current or expected market rates (for direct
investment) whenever(and at all times that) the aggregate dernancjs for
forward commitments atequilibrium rates (r) are even approximately as
large as the suppliesforthcoming at those rates from risk-averse companies
facing uncertain futureinterest rates and negative covariances With their
flows of investiblefunds These conditions are sufficient analytically to
explain the observed persistenceof substantially positive commitment
premiums over time. Inparticular, the existence of such premiums is not
prima facie evidence ofmarket power in the hands of any lender or group
of lenders.There is other evidence indicating the existence ot such
bargaining power, but the observationof positive commitment premiums
per se is not asufficient condition for the inference of rket power.) This
completes my proof of generalconclusion iv in tht Introductn and the
Comment that follows it.
Addendum Up to this point the focus has been on the total forward
commitment position (C,) which the institutional leider (or industry) would
want to have outstanding at any given time treIaLve to the expected
volume of investible funds F,+ to be available at the time of takedown,
months later. (Subscripts have been added merely to delineat the calendar
dates involved.) The analysis has also been simplified by assumig that all
commitments are in a single asset with a fixed takedown lag. It can now
recognized that there will also be other loans (e.g., industrial and mu'tifam-
ily mortgages) for which commitments have been made some time earlier
but which are also expected to be drawn down at time t + r. We thus have
(1.16) C,=OC,+NC,
where OCcommitments already outstanding at the beginning of time
for drawdown at t + r;26 and NC,new commitments made at timet, If
now we also define
(1.17) N, - OC
it is immediately apparent that we can subtract OC, from both sides of
equation 1.9b and rewrite the latter as
(1.9b')NC, = -
.+ b1r, yVr
Moreover, all our earlier analysis relating C, to ,e+. carries over without any
a
I
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other change to the new commitments currently entered into relative to the
net expected fund position (t1i) after allowing for the already outstanding
commitments due to be drawn down at this future date. In particular, all
the above conclusions regarding conditions for positive commitment pre-
miums and conditionalshiftsin commitment supply functions apply
directly and equivalently to new commitments (NC11) as well as to total
commitment positions and funds (C and
11.41 Allowance for Added Costs When the Volume
of Available Investible Funds Falls Short of the
Volume of Forward Commitments
In the formal analysis so far, it has been assumed that a single market rate r
(see equation 1 .5a) measures both the rate of return on the volume of funds
(i.e., F - C) directly investedin the market when F > C and the
opportunity cost of the funds obtained to satisfy shortfalls (F < C). In the
former circumstance, it is clear that the relevant market rate is the yield on
publicly issued long-term bonds. The assumption made to this pointthat
the same rate measures the cost of funds required to cover shortfalls
clearly involves no serious distortions so long as the shortfalls are relatively
small, infrequent, and of short duration. But in general, the costs involved
in shortfalls will be greater than the direct investment rateand usually, by
amounts which increase with the amount of the shortfall. Companies are
most reluctant to permit any large reduction in liquidity stocks because
such a development would entail sharply rising opportunity costs. When
the shortfall is large relative to the small cushion provided by liquidity, the
companies will consequently be forced to resort either to emergency sales
of long-term bonds from existing portfolios or to borrowing. Moreover,
such large shortfalls are most likely to occur when long-term rates are high
relative to previous norms and rising rapidly." Heavy sales made within a
limited period of time into such weak markets must almost always be made
on a yield basis higher than existing rates on new issues; and the yields
forgone on the existing assets sold to cover the shortfall will be consid-
erably higher28 than the yield which coLild have been realized on any
positive level of F > C, that might have occurred at the same time.29
Similarly, borrowing from commercial banks to cover such shortfalls would
have to be done at rates higher than the current rate on long-term market
securitiesagain because shortfalls appear when rates are higher than had
been anticipated and in periods of tight money. At such times, short rates
in general and prime commercial bank lending rates in particular (even
before allowance for added compensating balances) are higher than long
rates.In order to introducethese considerations intothe formal analysis, itis
necessary to rewriteequation1 .5a thus:
(1.5a')V = Cr- (F -C)Fm + (F - C)l
Cr + (F - C) Fm +(F - C(? - Fm)
where
- (F - C) when F -- C
Fmthe random yield on new issuesof securitiesn the market at the
time of takedown on commitments.
either the yield forgone on satesof portfolio securities (measured in
terms of net salesproceeds after deducting all costs attributable to
the sale) or the interest cost of borrowingcalculated in terms of net
usable funds-
It will be observed that thefinal form of equation 1 .5a' is the same as
equation 1 .5a except for the additional term.So long as forward commit-
ments are kept tow enough topreclude any chance of a shortfall, this final
term can be ignored (because then(F - C) = 0 with certainty). But with
any given distribution ofF, further increases in forward commitments will
involve increasingly large chances of shortfalls, and the exiected value of
(F - C)- will become an increasingly large negative number. Moreover,
since the principal source of the random fluctuations in F about its
expected value is the random fluctuations in interest rates about their
expected values, this inverse relation and the risk aversion of the com-
panies make it almost certain that significant negative values of (F -
will be associated with upward movements in interest rates when the latter
are already at a relatively high level.° But at such times, F, > Fm because
the sale of portfolio assets will be taking place in a weak securities market
and short-term rates for borrowing will be high and will exceed the
open-market rates for purchases of long-term bonds. Indeed, the short-long
spread in rates will itself be an increasing function of the movements in the
general level of rates.
These considerations lead directly to the conclusion that so long as there
is any chance of a shortfall, an allowance for the added costs which would
be involved necessarily reduces the expected value of the income stream
produced by any forward commitment position. Formally, we have
Y = E [CFC + (F - C)rmj + E ((F - CY(F, - Fm )].
The expectation of the first expression within brackets is given by equation







C) when F - C <0.
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1 .6a; the expectation of the second is negative for two compounding
reasons. First, the product of the expectatrons, over all values of F <C, of
the two terms in parentheses is negative because the first is inherently
negative and the second is positive; and the expectation is further reduced
by the negative covariance between the first and second terms. Second, the
negative expected value of the second bracketed expression falls (becomes
negatively larger) at an increasing rate as forward commitment positions
are increased in the relevant range under any given set of circumstances.
Similarly, it is shown in Appendix A that allowance for the incremental
losses of investment income involved in shortfalls of investible funds
necessarily increases the variance of the level of investment income
involved in any forward commitment position so long as there is any
chance of such a shortfall occurring. And once again, the increase in the
variance of investment income will grow at an increasing rate as forward
commitment positions are progressively raised beyond the point where
shortfalls involving penalty costs may occur.32
It is obvious from the earlier analysis that even with no risk aversion, the
expected value of the investment income associated with any given
commitment position will be reduced by the amount of penalty costs (?,
F,)associated with any shortfall of investible fundsand these reductions
in Y will, of themselves, reduce the size of the commitment position which
would otherwise be optimal in any given set of circumstances. Similarly,
because of risk aversion, these increases in the variance of the return
would of themselves reduce the commitment position that would otherwise
be taken. In fact, both effects operate simultaneously to restrain forward
commitment positions in the range where there is any significant chance of
a substantial shortfall. Moreover, increasing probabilities of shortfalls in-
volve reductions in the expected value and concurrent increases in the
variance of any given commitment position, and both effects increase at an
increasing rate. The costs and risks of shortfalls thus induce reductions in
optimal forward commitment positions, and those reductions increase at an
increasing rate as the probability of a shortfall increases. But for any given
expected E and probability distribution over investible funds, the chances
of a shortfall become larger as C increases (or as the "margin of safety," F
- C, becomes smaller). Consequently, with a given probability distribution
over investible funds (F), the costs and risks of shortfalls of F below prior
commitments induce reductions in forward commitment positions (from
the levels indicated by equation 1 .9b, above) that are both absolutely and
relatively greater as the volume of forward_commitments (C) approaches
the expected inflow of investible funds (F),i.e., as the safety margin
between C and F narrows.
Thus, conclusion ii(a) in the Introduction is established even in the case
when the distribution of F is independent of market rates. The analysis in
Appendix A shows that these nonlinearities are compounded by allowance













ti onfor the empirically strong negative dependence ofon. After incorpora-
ting our earlier analysis, we have established in general that thereduction
in optimal forward commitment levels due to shortfall costs and riskswill
be absolutely and relatively greater, (i) the higher the expectedlevel of
market interest rates; (ii) the greater the (negative) covariancebetween
interest rates and the inflow of investible funds; and (iii) thegreater the (Cx
ante) variance of interest rates and (iv) the greater the conditionalvariance
of investible funds, given interest rates.
It is important to observe further that explicit allowancefor the losses of
investment income or incremental costs incurredin the event of a shortfall
serves to reinforce my earlier conclusion thateven in purely competitive
markets, positive commitment premiumsare required if there are high
ratios of forward commitments in thepresence of riskaversion and
negative covariances between investible fundsand interest rate changes.
Even though allowance for shortfallcosts and risks reduces the optimal
commitment level (C4) associated withany given F, other things equal, it
remains true that with any given probabilitydistribution over F, C* will be
a rising function of the relevant commitmentpremium (r - f).just as in
the simpler model. However, in thesimpler model of subsection 1 .2,C
rose linearly with increases inr. We now see that with any given
assessment of future market rates (i) andprobability distribution ..ever
larger increases inrwill be required to bring forthsuccessive (equal-sized)
increments of forward commitments wheneveran allowance is made for
penalty costs associated with shortfallsof investible funds available from
normal sources. Moreover, since thesecosts and risks make the supply
function of forward commitmentsfrom each lenderconcave upward, the
aggregate supply of commitments from all lendersin the market will have
the same characteristic,as illustrated in Figure 2. My earlier conclusions
regarding the existence ofa positive equilibrium commitment premium
even in purely competitive marketsare thus reinforced when an explicit
allowance is made for shortfallcosts and risks.Itherefore revert to the
simpler competitive model ofsection 1.2 as I explore the impactof still other elements of the forwardcommitment decision.
[1.51 Optimal Policies When theCommitment Rate
Must Be Reduced to IncreaseVolume
To this point, I treated theforward commitmentrate available to anyone insurance companyas a given market datum. But ifris treated as a
constant that is independent of thecommitment level to which it applies,
then we are implicitlyassuming not only that allinsurance companiesare price takers in the marketbut that eachcompany could increase the
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FIGURE 2Supply and Demand Curves of Forward Com-
mitments (With Costs andRisksofFund
Shortfalls Recognized)
volume of its own commitments as much as it might wish without having
to cut its rate (or relax the "term and conditions"which amounts, in
effect, to reducing its interest charge). in other words, as in all standard
models of freely competitive markets, I assumed that the "demand" curve
facing the individual firm is horizontal, even though the aggregate demand
cuive for commitments from the whole industry (as drawn in figures 1 and
2, above) is a declining function of whatever rate is determined in the
market as a whole.
In this subsection, the earlier analysis is modified to allow for less than
perfectly elastic demands for forward commitments from individual com-
panies. While the demands for commitments from any given lender will of
course be considerably more elastic than the demands facing all lenders as
a group, the former almost surely have less than infinite elasticity whenever
the borrowers are facing a substantial but still rather limited number of
alternative suppliers of fu nds.
In equation 1 .5a above, the rate (re) an institution could obtain on the
forward commitments it made during any relatively short period of time
was fully determined by the supply-demand interactions in the entire
commitment market (as described in Section 1.3, above) and, at any given
time, was exogenously determined so far as an individual firm was
concerned. The firm could make all the commitments it wanted at this rate




























higher rate. This simplification can be readily removed by introducing a
declining demand curve34 for each institution's commitments, such as
(1.18) =- (CC/2),C >0,
in place of the (hitherto exogenous) rin equation 1 .5a and then tracing the
consequences of the substitution. In particular, expected income now
becomes
(1.6b)= Io - (cC/2)tIC + i+ ffF.r
but equations 1 .7a and I .7b, for the variances of the return, will be
unaffected. Proceeding as before, it is found that the optimal level of C
must satisfy
(1.8b) r0cC ?y(C F)Vr+yiffp.r= 0.
After relationF,r= bprVr is used (see equation 1 .9b, above), the optimal






In the limiting case, when c = 0, no price-cutting is required, and the
optimal level of commitments here is the same as in (1 .9b). The optimal
level of forward commitments available fromany company will always be
reduced by any need to reduce rates in order to get desired business, and
its C* will fall as c increases, i.e., as the volume of available commitments
becomes more dependent on the rate charged.
Even Fn the absence of any uncertainties about future fund flows, this
dependence of commitment demandupon rate would lead institutional
lenders to be less than fully committed, butas long as any company held to
the same estimates of the size of c and the otherparameters in equation
1.19, the ratio of its commitments to its expected funds (i.e., CtIF)would
be stable over time. Moreover, forany given expected volume (F) of
investible funds, the volume of its commitments will bereduced by any
increase in its expectation of future marketrates (ñ, or any increase in its
uncertainty regarding future rates, or any increase in itsassessment of the
negative dependence of its available fundson the level of future ratesall
as in the simpler cases considered earlier in subsection1.2.
Because the primary focus of the analysis hereis upon the effects on
forward commitments of these latter considerations,it will be assumed
hereafter that the commitment rate(re) is given by the market, independent
of the decisions of any single lender. Theoptimal commitment levels found
on the basis of a fixed r,, would be reduced byany appropriate allowance
for downward sloping demandcurves in exactly the same way as in the































[21 INSTITUTIONAL LENDERS RISK AVERSE WITH RESPECT
TO THE RATE OF RETURN OR NEW-MONEY RATE
In the previous section, the forward commitment policies of savings banks
and life insurance companies were examined under the assumption that
their objective was to optimize in terms of the level of the stream of
income that would be provided by their investments, taking account as risk
averters of the uncertainties in their assessments of those income streams. I
now analyze the forward commitment decision in parallel fashion under
the alternative assumption that the objective of lenders as risk averters is to
optimize in terms of the average rate of returnor new-money rate
realized on their investments. Although this new form of the objective
function leads to somewhat more difficult mathematics when the amount
of investible funds is not well known in advance, all major qualitative
conclusions of the simpler model already considered are found to hold. In
particular, changes in uncertainties and the assessment of covariances will
all affect the investing institution's forward commitment position in the
same direction (up or down) as before. It is also especially noteworthy that
withnew-money-ratecriteriaitisagain foundthat,with negative
covariances between investible funds and interest rates, companies will be
fully committed only if the yield on forward commitments is greater than
expected future market interest rates. Indeed,Ishow that with new-
money-rate criteria, the excess of commitment rates over expected market
rates must be even larger than that required with the earlier investment
income criterion to justify any given level of forward commitments relative
to expected flows of investible income.
All the definitions of variables and specifications of the forward com-
mitment problem used in section 1 are maintained in this section except
that the company's risk-averse utility function is now denominated in terms
of the average rate of return on its investments:
Sif, the average rate of return earned on funds disbursed at time
t,i.e., the new-money rate.
, V the expected value and variance of .
hCitE, the fraction of total funds expected to be available for invest-
ment and which are comniitted in advance.
U()the company's (risk-averse) utility function over the average rate of
return on all funds disbursed at time t.
Just as it was appropriate in section 1 to analyze the behavior of lenders
concerned with the level of their investment income in terms of some given
level of absolute risk aversion,I now analyze the behavior otenders
concerned with rates of return in terms of some given level of proportion-
ate risk aversion. Although the intensity of any given tender's proportional
risk aversion (and his assessments of the distribution of) may vary over
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time or as a (unction ofwealth levels, changes in thedegree of relativerisk aversion will in practice be ofsecond order in terms of thepurposes of the present analysis, and I simplyassume that each lender actsat each point in time in terms ofa given proportionate risk aversion,x (which is likely, however, to havea different value for differentcompanies or banks). In sections 2.2, and 2.3,Ianalyze the optimal forwardcommitment decisions of lenders withconstant proportional risk aversionin terms of the means and variances of theiroverall rate of return,'.In this context, decisions to maximizeexpected utility, E[U(ci)J,can readily be shown to be those whichare optimal in ternis of thesimpler
(2.2)criterionchoose hto obtain max W(V, V1,)
where the welfareindex, W(Y, Vu),is
(2.2) W = Y- XV/2,
and A 4-1 > 0 is the relevantmeasure of constantproportional risk aversion, with larger valuesindicating greater riskaversion: a higher expected return will berequired to justifyany action involvingany given increase in risk. Giventhe functionalrelation of V and Vi,,respectively, with h, optimal h*will be that valuefor which
o ooh oVah
and using (2.2),this simplifies to
(2.3)
oh2 oh -
[2.11 The CommitmentDecision When ThereIs No
Uncertainty RegardingF
If theamount of investible fundsis knowj' inadvance, and theonly uncertainty involves theinterest rate (F) thatwii be realizedon the funds remaining available forspot investment aftertaking care ofcommitments the uncertainnew-money rate will begiven by
(2.4)=
= hr + (1 -







Dilferentiating these expressions and substituting into (2.3), we find that
optimal h* must satisfy
r--?+X(1 h)V,=0,
which simplifies to
(2.7)h* = 1rr,.- 1 +rr
[2.21 The Commitment Decision When the Amount of Investible
Funds Is Also Uncertain (Preliminary Analysis)
When cornpnies have a new-money-rate objective and both the amount
of funds (F) available for investment and the future market rate () are




= F + (C/F) (r,. -
or
(2.9) = F + hs.',
where, as before,
(2.10)h = CIE,
i.e., the ratio of the amount of commitments to the amount of funds
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te of will be considerably greater that the new-money rate will fall short ofts
dime expected value than thatitwill be greater than expected; and
S to spondingly, the odds will be better than even that 'A' will lall short of 'A'.
d
In view of these considerations, when the amount of investible funds is
,let uncertain and a new-money-rate criterion is used, it is desirable to supple-
trier ment our analysis of optimal forward commitment policies in the usual
mean-variance context with an analysis that explicitly allows for skewness
preference as well as risk aversion in the usual sense. Because of the
complexity of the interactions involved, in the rest of this section I work
!zed) through a relatively simple illustration in some detail in order to lay bare
the economic rationale of the results of the following general analysis. In
section 2.3 I then develop the formal analysis of optimal forward commit-
ment policies, when F is uncertain and new-money-rate criteria are used,
rates in a mean-variance context. Specifically,I find ht, the forward commit-
ment position that will maximize E[U(9)] in equation 2.2 and thereby
satisfy equation 2.3. The results obtained in this mean-variance context are
of interest because they can be readily compared with those obtained in
sections1and 2.1, which were all also in a mean-variance context.
Finally, since even symmetrical assessments of I and F now introduce
asymmetries in the distribution of rates of return (9), in section 2.4, I also
allow for investor preferences with respect to the skewness (i.e., third
new- moment) of 9, along with their preferences regarding its mean and van-
itions ance. In this broader context, decisions to maximize expected utility
and r E[U(9)] are identical to those which are optimal under the following:
I level
(s
(2.15)criterion: choose h4 to maximize W(9, V, S)
tive is where V, and 5,, are the respective variance and skewness (third central
riance moment) of 9, and the welfare index W(9, V,,,Si,)is
tar of (2.16) W = 9 - XVf2 +
where X > 0 measures the degree of risk aversion, and 4 > 0 measures
the degree of preference for positive skewness (distribution of outcomes
"stretched" toward higher values) and/or the degree of dispreference for
smaller positiveor larger negativeoutcomes)
As already suggested, the size of the reaction of forward commitments to
any change in circumstances will generally be somewhat different in these
two formulations of the new-money-rate criterion when investible funds
are uncertain, and they will also differ somewhat in size from the effects
found earlier (section 2) when an investment income objective was as-
sumed.33 Nevertheless, more detailed analysis of both these new-money-
rate models shows that the direction of the effect of any change in
conditions on the level of forward commitments (i.e., the sign of the
derivative of hwith respect to each variable) is still the same whether orL
not skewness preference is allowed for--and also whether theobjective is
taken to be the newmoney rate or the level of the stream of investment
income produced (as in section 1).
Consequently, conclusions ii,iii, and iv of the Introductionare re-
established in both new-money-rate models, andthe 'reinforcing" conclu-
sion (v)is also proved. In the rest of this subsection,
Pillustrate these
conclusions in ordinary language withthe aid of a simple numerical
example. Rigorous proofs of the generalityof the results are given in
subsections 2.3 and 2,4.
The economic rationale underlyingthe foregoing analytical results builds
upon the combination of two basic factualconsiderations: Changes in
market rates affect not only (i)the yields obtainable in the futureon the
direct investment of fundsnot committed in advance, but also (ii) thetotal
amount of funds available for investmentat the time the funds on forward
commitments are to be disbursed, Ifmarket rates easeover the commit-
ment period, the supply of funds forinvestment will almost surely be larger
than if rates had heldsteady. Correspondingly,if market rates should
increase sharplyover the commitment period, theinduced increases in policy loans and reductionsin prepaymentson outstanding mortgages will reduce the supply offunds available forinvestment.
The importantinteractions between thesetwo effects can be broughtout by consideritig thevery simple situation in whichcurrent commitment rates are equal to expectedfuture market rates (andall forward commit- ments have the same takedownperiod). Suppose thata company in this situation makes forwardcommitments equal to Xpercent of the total amount of funds it expects to haveavailable for investmentat the time of takedown. It could ofcourse have committed less thanX percent forward now and had a correspondinglylarger amount of fundsremaining at the end of the takedownperiod for directinvestment at the marketrate prevailing at that time.If market yields havedeclined meanwhile,the larger comnhitmentwould look good withhindsight becausesome funds will have beeninvested at the higherrates available when thecommitment was made, but the fallin rates will havemade theamount of funds available for investmentlarger thananticipated. Because of thisnegative correlation betweenavailable funds andmarket rates, the fundscommitted forward turn outto be less than Xpercent of the actualsupply of investment funds and thefraction of high-yieldinginvestments is smaller than expected.Correspondingly, if interestrates increase betweenthe time commitments are made andtaken down,forward commitmentswill have incurred theopportunity loss of thesubsequent rise inyields. In addition, the rise in marketyields will havemade theamount of funds availablefor investment smaller thanexpected, with theresult that the(relatively) low-yielding investolentswill turn outto representa larger fraction of the total funds usedto compute thenew-money rate. Combiningthe two
C
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future market rates, the relative gains in new-money rates obtained by
committing forward before interest rates decline are always (andmay be
substantially) smaller than the losses incurred by having committed forward
before interest rates increase. However, any excess of currently available
commitment rates (including fees) over expected future market rates will of
course improve the new-money-rate performance of any forward commit-
ment position. We thus have the general proposition: Unless current
commitment rates (and fees) are sufficiently higher than the market rates
expected at time of takedown, the expected new-money rate will fallas
forward commitment positions are increased.°
A simple numerical example will illustrate the countervailing forces just
described and confirm their negative net effect on expected new-money
rates as forward commitment positions are extended in the absence of
sufficient premiums in rates on commitments. Suppose that commitments
with a nine-month takedown can be made now at an 8.5 percent yield,
and that current judgments are that it is equally likely that market yieldson
direct investments will either go up to 9.5 percent or stay at 8.5 percentor
fall to 7.5 percent by the end of the nine-month period. At that point, the
company expects to have $100 million to invest, as it will if rates turn out
to be 8.5 percent; but if interest rates fall to 7.5 percent it will wind up
having to invest $120 million, and if rates go up to 9.5 percent it will have
only $80 million available. The results of alternative decisions to commit
forward 0, $20 million, $40 million, $60 million, or $80 million of the
expected $100 million of investible funds are given in Table 1. The dollar
amounts committed forward at an 8.5 percent yield are shown in column
1; and columns 2, 4, and 6 give the amounts of funds remaining for
investment at the respective later market rates of 7.5 percent, 8.5 percent,
or 9.5 percent. The new-money rates for the resulting investment positions
conditional on the level of the iater market rate are given in columns 3, 5,
and 7.Finally,in column 8, the average or expected value of the
new-money rate is shown, with equal weight given to the three outcomes
thought to be equally likely. (The remaining columns will be considered
later.) It is apparent from this example that when (or if) the new commit-
ment rate is the same as the expected value of the future market rate, larger
forward commitment positions produce progressively lower expected
(average) new-money rates (but with the benefit to risk-averse investors of
lower risk, as explained below).
Why then do lenders relying on a new-money-rate criterion heavily use
forward commitments in their investment operations? One reason is clearly
that the yields available on forward commitments have been higher than
the rates currently available in the open marketand also higher than the
open-market rates expected at the time of takedown.' And Table 2
illustrates the general principle that when forward commitment yields are


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sufficiently higher than expected future open-market rates, the expected
new-money rate will increase, rather than decrease, as the forward com-
mitment position increases. Just how much premium makes commitment
yields enough higher to prevent expected new-money rates from falling as
forward commitment positions are extended of course depends on other
conditionsas analyzed algebraically below.
Another reason why institutional lenders commit forward rather heavily
even at times when expected new-money yields are decreased or are
unaffected by such action42 is that (as discussed later) the dispersion of
new-money rates is progressively reduced by increases in forward com-
mitment positions up to the point where risks of absolute shortfalls of
investible funds become important. This reduction in the dispersionof
new-money rates is produced by the negative covariance between interest
rates and investible funds. Since the risks of shortfallsare generally quite
small until commitments reach relatively high levels, therelation between
new-money-rate dispersion and commitment levelsover all commitment
levels up to perhaps 80 percentcan be determined to a good approxima-
tion without considering the added effect of possible shortfalls;column 9 in
tables 1 and 2 has been calculatedon this basis. As illustrated there and
clarified in the notes to Table 1, this reductionin a, as forward commit-
ments are increased up to high levels is found whetherexpected new-
money rates are rising or falling withcommitments.ndeed, over this
range, increased commitments reduce theuncertainties regarding new-
money rates somewhat more rapidly at timeswhen expected new-money
rates will he reduced rather than increased bylarger commitment posi-
tions. Since all the evidence indicates thatinstitutional lenders are risk-
averse investors, the reduction in the risks anduncertainties of realized
rates of return resulting from heaviercommitment positions servesas a
pervasive and strong stimulus for thoselenders to increase their forward
commitment positions, at leastup to the level where shortfall consid-
erations become important.
The stimulus to forwardcommitments as a means of risk reductionhas of
course been strong in all the models developedin this paper. As explained
in sections 1.1 and 2.1, above,the essential reason why lenderswould be fully committed (even withno commitment premium) if they knewin advance the amount ofinvestible funds they would haveavailable at takedown time is that theycould then reduce theiruncertainties regarding
investment returns when CF by adding to theircommitment positions. We now see that thesame risk-reducing effecton new-money rates is




where these "fund shortfallcosts and risks" becomeImportant. The
dispersion risks in terms of whichinstitutional lenders make their decisions
has the latterly rising pattern of thedashed line in Figure 3 (rather than the
solid line which depicts the datain column 9 of Table 1; in the latter,
shortfall sources of dispersionare ignored).
But when institutional lenders judgeperformance by new-money rates
and allow for the negative dependenceof investible funds on uncertain
future interest rates, there ismore to the story. (For simplicity, shortfall
effects are for the moment againignored,) As illustrated in the last columns
FIGURE 3Dispersion and Skewness ofNew-Money Rates
As a Function of Forward CommitmentPosition
Relative to Expected InvestihleFunds
h 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
= standard deviation of new-money rates.
= skewness of new-money rate.
h = forward commitments (C) as a percent of the expectedsupply of investible funds (F)
SOURCE:Solid line in upper quadrant: Table 2.1, column 9. Solid linein lower quadrant: Table 2.1,
column 10. Dashed lines show results when allowance is madefor added costs and risks of
shortfalls of inyestjble funds.480 John Lintner
of tables 1 and 2, the usual statistical measure of skewness (seenotes to
Table 1) appled to the new-money rates in our examples isnegative and
becomes progressively more so at an increasing rate as forwardcommjt
ment positions are increased. This statistic is a normalized measurewhich
when negative, indexes the extent to which the probabilities ofshortfalls
from expected values exceed the chances of better-than-expectedout-
comes. Institutional lenders are not only risk-averse investors but theyalso
have a marked disprelerence for negative skewness. Otherthings equal,
they would clearly prefer investments offering greaterchances of higher
returns to those on which the betting odds favored returns belowexpected
values. Forward commitments shift the odds towardshortfalls in reaIjzeJ
returns (p), and this fact must also be recognized asan important consid-
eration in decisions on appropriate forwardcommitment levels,
The relative importance of this consideration,however, will dependon
the strength of the dispreference fornegative skewness (measured by ,
derived from the utility function);on how much the odds are tiltedor
stretched toward shortfalls; arid, also,on how large the negative shortfalls
are likely to be. We have alreadyseen that since forward commitmentsare made at a known yield, increasingcommitments serves to reduce theshare of investible funds subjectto uncertainties inrates. Even thoughan
increase in forward commitments tilts therelative odds toward shortfallsin
new-money rates, it also reduces the relativeamount of funds subjectto either higher or lowerreturns than expected.
These two countervailingskewness effectsare combined in column io






















(reative to f)and indeed increase at anincreasing rate--the pattern of s,
which actually affects commitmentdecisions, will decline when commit-
ment levels range betweenabout 33 percent to 80 or 90 percentof
expected funds, and will thereafter riserapidly4 as indicated by the sashed
line in Figure 3.
The particular level offorward commitments that will be bestfor any
given institutional lenderin any given set of circumstancesof course will
depend not only on prevailingconditions and on the particular setof
assessments used, butalso and very importantly, on thedegree of risk
aversion of the lender and onhow much it is willing to give up inexpected
new-money yields inorder to reduce the undesireddowntilt in the distribu-
tion of its uncertain new-moneyrates. The numerical illustration cando no
more than lay bare someof the more important currentsand counterforces
at work, andprovide a concrete setting for myverbal explanation and
discussion of the significantinfluences that bear on the finalchoices made.
In the rest of this section Iconsequently provide a moredetailed and
more generalmathematical analysis of optimalforward commitment posi-
tions when the new-money-ratecriterion is applied and there is asignificant
negative covariance betweeninterest rates and the amountof investible
funds.44 Using equations 2.8-2.14,Ifocus on a symmetricthree-point
distribution of possible interest rates,4in which there is a
[ lOOp% chance of =
10 (2.17) lOOp% chance of= e, and a



















x0 is the commitmentpremium (r- ) asin equation 2.14:and /3 > 0
omes
represents the negativeslope coefficient(standardized covariance) between
level
the percent changes ininvestible funds and marketinterest rates, as in
z
where p < 0.5 and= r - F, asshown in equation 2.12,and e is the
absolute number of units ofdisplacement offrom zero.46 With these
distributions, we now have thevariance of the interest rategiven by
(2.18)V 2pe1.
Also the expected valueof'in (2.1 Ia) is given by
/x6 -. e) + (1--)xo + (2.19) W1 fie








Observe that the criticalvalue of thecommitment premium,x0 =- increases (Or decreases)with the (negative)covariance indexed byf3.4' For simplicity, Iignore the effects ofshortfall riskson the variance of flew-money rates (Vs) until later.From (2.9),we have directly
(2.26)V.VrhzV + 2hOwr.
[2.3j OptimalForward Commitmentswith Uncertain Funder a Mean-Variance Criterionfor New-MoneyRates I now derive theoptimal commitmentposition, using themean-variance criterion in equation2.2, by finding thevalue of forwardCommitments (h) that will satisfy
(2 273W a A
- 0 ah ah 23h
When the valuesofand V1, from (2.24)and (2.26)are substituted, and derivatives are taken,itis found that
(2.28)aW/ah =- A (hV + o-,.) = 0,
equation 2.13 above. Finally, the covariance betweenw and r is found to
be
(2.21)0wrE ('Vv)(i = E[ë(i' - ?)J =KVr,
and the variance ofw,
(2.22)V =-)2= K2VrM
where
(2.23) M1 + (1 - 2p)J32 e2 > 1;p0.5.
From equation 2.9,we also have
(2.24)= f +




1 - - T (1-2p)j32e2
482
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wth the result thatthe optima! forward commitment position is given by0
(2.29) ATwr
xvu
This expression may be written in more transparent form by substituting
(2.18)(2.23), which show that
(2.29a)h x0 - K13Vr f AKVr - __
AK2VrM XV,KM
1 x0+ (1 -13/A)] KM[ AKVr
= KM
E- 13/A].
We first observe that in the limit, as the covariance/3 between available
funds and interest rates approaches zero, these expressions forh* reduceto
equation 2.7, so that firms using this rate-of-return criterion will be fully
invested (in the absence of penalty costs on shortfalls) when commitment
rates are non-negative and /3 = O.' But when the commitment premium
(x0) is zero and /3 > 0 [so that by (2.13), there is a negative covariance
between available funds and interest ratesi, the companies will be less than
fully invested, as before, since the first term in the last line is thenzero by
assumption, and the /3 value will reduce the rest of the expression below
unity.5 Moreover, other things equal, forward commitment positionsvary
inversely with the intensity of the risk aversion of the lenders (see Note 3 in
Appendix B), and as /3 rises (reflecting more negative covariance of F with
1) optimal commitment positions will be further reduced. Optimal forward
of commitment positions clearly vary directly with the expected commitment
premium (x0 =- ?); and the amount of added commitment premium
required to raise h* by any given amount will be greater: (I) the greater the
uncertainty of interest rates (Vr), (ii) the greater the negative covariance (/3)
between investible funds and interest rates,(iii) the greater the lenders'
proportionate risk aversion (A), and (iv) the higher the level of the expected
market rate (see Note 4 in Appendix B).
rice These conclusions for institutional lenders pursuing new-money-rate
(h) objectives are based on the mean-variance equation (2.29a); theyare, of
course, qualitatively the same as those obtained more simply from the
investment income model in subsection 1.2. In addition, since the supply
of forward commitments of institutional lenders pursuing new-money-rate
objectives is simply Ct = h,F, the general conclusions of the analysis in
section 1.3 continue to hold. In particular, whenever the market clearing
demand for commitments approaches F, the equilibrium values ofr and i







inequality! > 1; and this is true even ifno allowance is made for the penalty costs thatare generally irwolvedex ante in possible shortfalls.
Finally, in this
mean-variance new-money-rate model,any allowance for increased variancesin new.-moneyrates due to the risks andcosts of shortfalls at highcommitment levels, i.e.,use of a variance function that behaved like the dashedline (rather than thesolid line) in Figure3would simply reduceoptimal commitmentpositions below the levelsthey oth- erwise would havehad, so longas commitment levelswere high enough anyway for lendersto begin to incur shortfallrisks.The expected valueof the new-moneyrate would also be loweredby the addedcosts associated with such shortfalls.But although thosecosts and added varianceswould lower the levelsof forwardcommitment positions,ceteris paribus, the conclusions regardingthe effectson optimal hresulting from changesin the levels of13, x0, and A are allunchanged (see Note5 in Appendix B). Moreover, theceteris are not paribus,and allowance forthe risks andcosts associated with shortfallsrequires that the purelycompetitive market equilibrium rateon forwardcommitments (re) be stillhigher (relativeto the expected future rate,?, on new directinvestments)
12.4J OptimalForward CommitmentsWhen the Amount of lnvestjbleFunds Is Uncertainand the Skewness
Preference OflNew-Money RatesIs Taken Accountof Ifirst establishthat even withsymmetrica' probabilitydistributions of interest rates (F), andof investible funds(F) Conditionalon interest rates, the new-money rate () willbe subjectto negative skewnessthroughout the relevant region whenthe covariance0FT < 0.I then prove theimpact of such skewnesson the optimalforwardcommitment Positionsof investors who are not onlyrisk averse inthe usualsense but also havea disprefer ence for negativeskewness.
From equation2.9, the thirdmoment (whichdetermines theskewness) of 2 is given by
Ff1 + --- h)Ja
Efë + h('-
(2.30) 3hA + 3h28+ h3S
where Erepresents mathematical









re(2.32)13 = 2E(ét) +E(ê)
= E(ët'2) - 2iwr + 0
and
(2.33) Se,, -
For the representative symmetrical probability distribution in (2.17), it
may be shown that the values of A, B, and Sin equations 2.30-2.33 are
as follows:
2p(l - 2p)fie4(1 - f3x0)
(2.31a)A- (1 - /32e2)
= - KVG <0; using (2)8) and (2.20)
where
(2.34)C(1 - 2p)fle2 > 0;
(2.32a)
4p(l - 2p)/3e4(1 - /3x0)2
(1 - p2e2)2
= - 2AK = +2KV,G > 0. using (2.31a)
2p(1 - 2p)j3e4(1 -xo)'[3 + (1 - 4p)/32e2] (2.33a)Sw = (1 -2e2)3
= AK[3 + (1 - 4p)2e2] < 0
= - V7GK3H < o. using (2.31a)
where
(2.35)H = 3 -f (1 - 4p)f32e2 > 0.
Consequently, inserting (2.31a)(2,33a) into (2.30), wehave
(2.30a)S = hA(3 - 6hK + h2K2I-i)
= - hKV,C[3(1 - hk)2 + h2K2(1 -4p)/32e2]
As shown just below, the optimizing conditionsdepend critically on the
sign of S. It is important to observe that S,, isinherently negative for all
symmetrical distributions of interest rates involving three (ormore) possible
outcomes,54 and 5, will also be negative forall relevant values of all other
variables (see Note 6 in Appendix B). But since we have notyet introduced
the added negative skewness that is induced at highlevels of h by the costs
and chances of shortfalls,Sin equation 2.30a will become less negative
ash increases beyond relatively low levels (seeNote 7 in Appendix B). (I
return to this matter later.)
With this preparation, values for )7, V, and S,from (2.24), (2.25), and
(2.30a) can be substituted into the objectivefunction 2.16 and derivatives
taken with respect to h to determine theoptimal forward commitment
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pOsition (h*) when thedecision reflects disprelerence fornegative skewness as well as risk aversionin the usual sense:
(2.36)
h 2ah 6ah
- A(hV, + + c{A f 2h8 + h2S.]/20.
Equation 2.36 isa quadratic equation in h whichmay he written
(2.37)ah' - b/i ± c= 0
where
(2.37a)a'bSw/2- cb/VrCH/2 <0 using (233a)
(2.37b)b = AV,- çB = AV, - 2K2V,G using (2.32a)
andso





Solutions for h inequations 2.36 (or 2.37) willhe real if the discriminant (D) is positive,i.e., when
(2.38)9 =- 4ac > 0
(Xv- 2K2vrG)2 + 2K)VrCH[)Vwh*- cbKVrGI2}> 0.
Itis safe toassume that this conditionis always satisfied,since in fact lenders do takeobservable (and positive)forward commitmentpositions (see Note 8 in AppendixB). Moreover, withD > 0, the relevantsolution (see Note 9 in AppendixB) of equation 2.36for the firm'soptimal forward commitment position whenit allows forskewness considerationsis
2 39)/i*AV - - AV. +B (. -
\'DAVr 2 - .-- +
KH using ft2.32a), (2.33a), and(2.35)]
John Iintner
















Incremental Effects of the Dispreference for Negative SkewnessSince it
has been shown that the skewness of the new-money rate (5k) is inherently
negative, it might appear that institutional investors having a dispreference
for negative skewness (> 0 in criterion function 2.16) will necessarily
adopt smaller forward commitment positions than they would have cho-
sen, other things equal, if they had simply used a mean-variance criterion
and ignored skewness effects. The optimal forward commitment position
(h'), however, depends upon the marginal effects of a small increase in h
on the level of the criterion, and will consequently be the value of h that
satisfies (2.36), not (2.16). Examination of the totai differentials of the
optimizing condition (2.36) readily establishes that the effects of allowance
for skewness preferences upon the optimal forward commitment position
almost certainly have the same sign as aS/ah which measures the change
in new-money-rate skewness as h is increased,57 i.e.,
(2.40)sign (dhVdcb) = sign (aS/ah).
The analysis in Note 7 of Appendix B shows that if there are no penalty
costs associated with shortfalls, the value of the negative algebraicskew-
ness of new-money rates increases with increasingh (i.e., aSIah > 0) so
long as the lender is more than about one-third committed (see thesolid
portion of the Scurve in Figure 3). On the basis of thiscondition,
(2.41)h >
when h,> 0.35 (approximately), i.e.,in this case, lenders wary of
skewness will be more heavily committed than they would have been if
mean-variance criteria had been used and skewness disregarded,other
things being equal. However, if and whenever significant penalty costs are
associated with shortfall risks,it can be shown that increasing commit-
ments increases the absolute value of the negative skewness, i.e.,.9S/t3h <
0. Indeed, both the probabilities and special costs of ashortfall increase
rapidly as commitment positions increase, resulting in a2S/ah2 < 0 aswell
as aS/ah < 0 whenever h wouldotherwise be relatively large (see the
more analytic development ofessentially the same point in Note 4 of
Appendix C). Consequently, when there are significant penalty costsand
commitment positions would otherwise be high (apartfrom skewness
considerations), h < h; and the extent of the reductionin the commit-
ment positions which otherwise would havebeen taken will be larger at
higher commitment levels. Moreover,it follows that the commitment
premium otherwise required to induce any givenand relatively high
forward commitment position will be increased byskewness consid-
erations whenever significant penalty costs areattached to potential
shortfalls.
Interest Rate Expectations 4873] FORWARD COMMITMENT POSITIONS OF LENDERSRISK
AVERSE TO RELATIVE NEWMONEY-RATEPERFORMANCE
In the previous sectionwe examined the optimal forward commitment
positions of risk-averse institutional lenders whowere judging their perfor-
mance by their rates of return (new-moneyrate) on the funds invested.
While field work indicated thatthis was the predominant objective ofmost
saving banks and insurancecompanies during most of the last decade,
increasing concern with the relativenew-money rate (their own rate in
comparison with their competitors')in the latter part of the periodwas also
observed. This concernwas especially strong among life insurancecorn-
panies which were heavily involvedin group insurance and actively
seeking to increase theirmarket share in this type of business.
I now analyze the optimalforward commitment positions of institutions
that focus on a relativenew-money-rate objective. In keeping with the field
work and as in the previoussection,I assume that institutionsare risk-
averse optimizers of this objective and thattheir decisions also reflecta
dispreference for negative skewness:They seek to increase their relative
new-money rates, but are averse touncertainty regarding their relative
performance and to actions thatraise the odds that their relativereturns will be less favorable thanexpected.I move immediately to thecase in which the amount ofevery firm's investible funds is uncertain.59
All the definitions ofvariables and specification of the forwardcommit- ment problem used previouslyare maintained. In addition, subscriptI denotes the institution makingthe decisions, and subscript0 the other
institution (or relevantaverage of other institutions) which Iregards as its relevant competition.More important, the focus of theanalysis shifts to differences in new-moneyrates:
h. C, the fraction of the expected totalinvestible funds of the ith
company which it chooses to commitin advance; h0 CO/FOthe corresponding fractionalforward commitmentposition of the ith company's"competition"; -
the difference betweenthe uncertainnew-money earnings
rate of the ith company andits competition; y* vi,,, Si,.the expected value,variance, and thirdmoment of the
random difference inreturn; U(y*)
o)the ith institution's utilityfunction over thedifferences be- tween its new-moneyrate and that of itscompetition where U'(9*) > 0,U"(}) < 0, and U"()> 0; i.e.,it seeks to increase, but is averse to uncertainty regarding
its relativenew-earnings rate, and likespositive skewness


































interest Rate Expectations 4B9
For later reference,I observe that decisions to maximize the expected
utility of relative new-money-rate performance E[u(*)J are identical to
those which are optimal under the analytic criterion:
(3.1)criterion: for any given value of h0, choose hto max W(*,
V1,., SQ.)
where
(3.la)Q* = W(4, Vi,., Si,.) XVI2 + 4,516,
with X > 0 again measuring the ith company's aversion torisk or
uncertainty per se and 4 > 0 measuring the strength of its preference for
positive skewness and, also, its dispreference for negative skewness in its
relative performance.
At any given time, the ith institution and its competitors can obtain
approximately the same rates on forward commitments and, at the end of
the period, will face the same current market rate. Also, the negative
covariance between interest rate movements and the percent deviation of
investible funds will often be similar in magnitude. For convenience,I
simply assume that the compound variable s' given in equation 2.11,
above, has the same distribution for the ith institution and its competitors.6°
Then from equation 2.9, we have its new-money rate:
(3.2a)= I + hg',
and its competitor's
(3.2b) I + h0A';
hence, its relative new-money rate is
(3.2c) =-= (h, - h0)' =
where for convenience we write
(3.3)z =- h0.
For any given commitment position of its competition, the ith institution
will choose itsh(orz7) to maximize Q* in equation 3.la. But from (3.2c)
we know that
(3.4)= z'; V= z2V; and S= z'S.
When we set the derivatives of (3,la) to zero, we consequently find the
optimal zas the solution to
aQ a x av: +, =
az öz 2az 6az0161
13.5a)
a
AVz + - 0.
2
This equation has realroots only if its discriminantis non-negative,i.e., if
(36) D = x2V1?.- 0
and this conditionwill always be satisfiedwhenever s'0 since,as shown in equation2.33a, the skewnessterm (Sw) is inherentlynegative.62 While effectiverestrictions are placedon the variables whenv' < 0, it is safe to assume thatcondition 3.6 will bealways satisfied, since,in fact, institutions do takeforward commitmentpositions.63 Moreover,with D > 0, the relevant solution(see Note I of AppendixC) of equation 3.5 forthe firm's optimalrelative forwardcommitment position is
7)z - \/X2V2 - 2S VA2VI1 - 24S- \VIL.
cbSw iT
We can readilyestablish the followingpatterns of behavior ofrisk-averse institutions that alsodislike negativeskewness and thatchoose their forward commitmentlevels to optimizetheir position interms of their new-money rate relativeto their competition:
I,If commitmentpremiums were negative(or sufficientlysmall), with the result thats' < 0, institutionsfocusing on relativenew-money rates would be lessheavily committedahead than theircompetitors.64 In particular, ifthe rate availableon forward commitmentsis no higher than theexpected value ofthe future marketrate for immediate purchases,he.,if r < F,then everyinstitution actingon a relative new-money-rate criterionwill undertaketo be less heavilycommitted ahead than itscompetition. This istrue because' will always benegative whenever commitmentrates (re) fail toexceed F (see lastsix columnsin upper panel of Table3 and equations2.25a and 2.25b). The dryingup of forward
commitments underthese circumstances will ofcourse serve to raisethe availablecommitment rate relativeto the expected futuremarket rate.Consequently, thefollowing Importantfurther conclusion isestablished: As inthe casesexamined insections 1.2, 1.4, and 2.2,65 inwhich firms seekto optimize absolute










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9for commitments from all lenders is a large fraction of their aggregate
expected investible funds.
iv.. The size of the forward commitment premium [(re - i) = X0]
required for institutions focusing on relative new-money rates to be willing
to be as heavily committed ahead as their competitors will depend on the
probability distribution implicitly used, but in every case this commitment
premium will have to be larger the greater its uncertainty regarding interest
rates and, also, the greater the (negative) effect of interest rate changes on
available funds. Both effects are illustrated in the bottom half of Table 3,
and are clear from equations 2.25a and 2.25b, since in general. z0 if
and only if> 0.'
Moreover, other things equal, the optimal forward commitment
position of such institutions relative to that of their competitors will vary
directly with the size of the commitment premium available in the mar-
ket.'7 In the context of the whole forward commitment market, the added
supplies of commitments from institutions responding in this way to large
commitment premiums [the demand (schedule) for commitments being
givenl will tend to lower the commitment rate available and, hence, the
commitment premium (althoughit would still remain positive). These
marketwide reactions in the present context parallel those analyzed above
in section 1.3. Moreover, the extent to which institutions will allow their
commitment positions to get ahead of those of their competitors is moder-
ated by the factors described in conclusions vi and vii, below.
Other things equal, the more risk averse an institution focusing on
relative new-money-rate performance may be, the more closely will it align
its forward commitment position with that of its principal competitors. For
instance, if commitment premiums are too small and' <0, h will be less
thanits competitor's position ho; but the largerits x (measuring risk
aversion), the more closely its hwill approach h0. Similarly, if w> 0, h>
h0, but h- h0 will again be smaller with larger X.'8
The above conclusions regarding the properties of the model for
relative new-money-rate performance hold whether or not an allowance is
made for the added costs and risks induced by considerations of potential
fund shortfalls, when an institution's absolute commitment levels begin to
approach its expected volume of investible funds. Allowance for the latter
considerations (which can become important when the institution's corn-
mitment position is large relative to its own I) reduces the relative forward
commitment position, z1 (and thereby its own absolute commitment posi-
tion,h1) which would otherwise have been optimal (see Note 2 of
Appendix C); and insures that its optimal z1 and h will each vary inversely
with the intensity of its dispreference for negative skewness, y (see Note 3
of Appendix C).
Interest Rate Expectations 493APPENDIX A EFFECTS OF PENALTY COSTS
OF SHORTFALLS OF INVESTIBLE FUNDS
BELOW PRIOR COMMITMENTS
The purpose of this appendix is to provide formal proofs of theconclusions
stated in section 1 .4 of the text. Specifically, Inow establish that when the
supply of funds available for future investmentis uncertain and penalty
costs (FFm > 0) will be incurred in the event of fund shortfalls (F <C): (i)
the expected returns associated withany forward commitment position (C)
are a declining function of the penalty costs and (ii)the variance of the
corresponding returnsis an increasing function of the penaltycosts;
consequently (iii),the optimal forward commitmentposition (C*) is a
fortiori monotonically reducedby these penalty costs.
Ifirst establish these propositionsunder the assumption that the distribu-
tions of available funds and marketinterest rates are independent (section
A.1), and then under themore realistic assumption (section A.2) that fund
flows are negatively correlatedwith market interest rates.In order to
reserve the usual notation F(.) for the lefttail of the cumulative probability
of any distribution, theuncertain amount of investibje funds isdenoted by
X, instead of, as in thetext, by F. For simplicity, however,I assume that
penalty costs aresome non-negative constant independentof the size of the conditional shortfall:69
iIma0
and F, rather than Fm, denotesthe uncertain marketrate; ris retained for
the fixed rate on funds underforward commitment. Otherwise,the notation
is unchanged from thatin the previous text.
Let us assume that bothX and F are normally distributed:
FN(F, Vr) and X = N(X, Vr).





Let f(.) be the normaldensity function; then
f() = o'(2y-°exp [(i - XP/2cr,fl
= 1(v)(2ir)°5 exp (v2/2)
(and similarly for F andth).
a





It will also be convenient to use the following supplementaryor derived
functions:
G(u) 1-- F(u) f(v)dv
and the "linear loss function"
(A.1O)L(u) = J'(v - u)cIF(v) = f(u) - vC(u)
which follows from the relation
(A.1 la) vdF(v) = f(u).
The following integrals are stated for later reference:°
(A.11b)
f'vdF(v) = f(u)
(A.12a) v2dF(v) = uf(u) + G(u)
(A.1 2b) v2dF(v) = uf(u) + F(u)
(A.13a) v3df(v) = f(u)(u2 + 2)
(A.13b) vdF(v) = f(u)(u + 2)
(A.14a) t'dF(v) = uf(u)(u2 + 3) + 3C(u)
(A.14b) vdF(v) = uf(u)(u2 + 3) + 3F(u).
As a final preliminary, we should note that (see Pratt, Raiffa, Schlaifer
1965, p. 17, eq. 9-67)
L(u) = u + L(u)
and that
1(u), F(u), C(u), L(u), L(u) > 0 for all - < u < .






















= (j2 + Vr) J'(XC)2dF(x)
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LA.11 Penalty Costs ofShortfallsWhen the
Distributions of X andr Are Independent
From equation l.5a',withXr = 0, we havefl




CTc(X - C)? + ax (V - u)dF(v)
(A.17) = Cr + (X - C)?- cxcTxL(u)
Note that, when0Xr = 0, as we are nowassuming, (A.17) is identicalto equation 1 .5a in thetext so long asa = 0. But whenever theinvestor will incur penaltycosts on shortfallsi.e., a > 0, theexpected return (Y Conditional on any levelof forwardcommitments varies inverselywith a.72 Moreover, the reductionin V due toany positive level ofconditional penalty Costsprogressively increasesat an increasingrate with the level of forwardcommitments (C).To determine thevariance, note that V= VZ. where




(X - CP(r + a)7dF(X)dF()- Z2
+ (2a7' + &2) jC(X - C)2cJF(X)- Z2
= (j2 + Vr)V
J(V - U)2dF(v)+ (2a? + a2)V f(V - U)2dF(v)- Z2.
Hence, using(A.12c), (A.12b),(A.1 ib), and(A.8)
VyV2 = (Fl f V)vx(1+ U2)
4- (2a? + a2)V[(J+ u2)F(u) + uf(u)l- Z. But from (A.17)and (A.18)
2= C)hF2 4 2a?VXUL(-(J)+ &V.L1tu).
and from (A.5),
(A2J)u2V = (X - C)2.
Consequentlywe have
VV2 = i2V +V[v+ (k -C)2] +
where aftersimplificatjofl74
H2iF(u) + afF(u)- L(u)L(u)Ji
We observe that whenXr = 0, as we are still assuming, (A.22) is identical
to (1 .7b) in the text so long as a = But it can be shown that H > 0 for
all C Ø76 Consequently, wheneverany shortfall of investible funds
entails positive penalty costs (a > 0), the variance of returns (V1) condi-
tional on any level of forward commitments increases directly with the
penalty cost rate (a).77 Moreover, the increase in the variance due to any
positive level of penalty costs progressively increases with the level of
forward commitments (C), and does so at an increasing rate until commit-
ments are well in excess of the expected level of investible funds (X).78
to Finally, when we differentiate (A.17) and (A.22) with respect to C and
substitute the results into our criterion equation 1.4 in the text, we find that
( with a > 0 but = 0, the optimal level of commitments (Ct) must now
72 satisfy
al -- aF(u) - y[(C - X)Vr + aif(u)rx + a2C(u)L(u)oxJ = 0.
of
Consequently, whenTXr= 0,
'A 24)C = X +--F(U)oox[if(u) + cG(u)LNii)]
YVr Vr
Once again, with OX,.0, equation A.24 reduces to equation 1.9a in the
text when there are no penalty costs, but whenever a > 0 the optimal level
of forward commitments will be lower than would otherwise be the case.
Indeed, since G(u) > 0 and L(u) > 0 for allfinite u, the optimal
commitment position (Ct) declines at an increasing rate with larger a.
[A.2] Expectation and Variance of Returns
and Optimal Commitment Positions When OXr < °
To establish that the empirically observed negative correlation ofwith F
reinforces each of the three conclusions obtained above under the assump-
Z2. tion that X and F were independently distributed, let it be assumed that
X = K -
and
C = K -
wheref3 > 0. For simplicity I continue to assume, as in equation A.1, that
the penalty costs are some non-negative constant independent of the size
of any shortfall of investible funds below commitments.
Substituting these values into equation 1 .5a'in the text, we have
V = Cr
+(K -r - C)rdF(r)1- F (K - /3r - C)(r + a)cIF(r)
er Interest Rate Expectations 497where (from A.25 and A.26)
(A.27)r, = (K - C)!$.
Consequently,
Y = Cr + /3
f(r, -r)rcIF(r) f(r, - r)(r + a)dF(r)
= Cr,ITr(w - m)(f ± mo-T)dF(m) +af3(rr
J(w - m)dF(m)
(A28)=Crc. +I3fWOr --I3Vr-Qf3cTrL(W)
after using (A.3L (A.6), (A 12a),and (A.1O). But from (A.25) and(A.26) we have
(A.29)0XrElKBr - (K - $?)J(r- F)i3Vr
and
(A30)/3wo- =J3(r -F) = IX - C),
Hence,
(A.31)Y = C(r,- 1) + FX + 0Xr - aI3o-rL(w).
When there are no penaltycosts (a = (J), (A.31) is thus identicalto (1 .6a) in the text, but wheneverthe investor will incurpositive penalty costson any shortfall of investible funds, theexpected return () associatedwith any forward commitmentposition varies inversely with thepenalty cost (a).9 Moreover, once again, thereduction in V due toany positive level of
conditionaj penalty costsprogressively increases at an increasingrate with the level of forwardcommitments 80
To determine the variancewhen °Xr < 0, (A.18)
VI = V7 = IreUX - Q+rJ2 dFfr)




(r, - r)2r2 dF(r) + (32r (r- r)2(r + a)2 dF(r) - 22 r.
= (r, - r)2r2 dF(r) + 2ap2 f(r- r)2 rdF(r) ire
+ f32 - r)2 dF(r) - 21.
This equationcan be written
(A.32') A
where it can be shownthatal
(A.33) A (31
J(r, - r)2r1dF(r) =$l?lVr(%2 + I)- 4(32iw+ (3IV(w2 + 3)
(A. 32)












(A34)B = 2aj3(r,. - r)2rdf(r) = 2c1PiV[C(w)- wL(tv)J + 4aJ3o-Ltw)
and
(A.35)C = a2J32V,.frrr)kIF(r) = af32Vr [Cv)- WL(w)I
and from (A.28),
72 = (Y- Cr,)2fVr frw aL(w)12,
Because these expressions are complex, I first establishthat when a = 0,
the equations are equivalent to equation 1.7bin the text, in which no
penalty costs were assumed for shortfalls but0%r < 0 was allowed for.I
then establish that V and V in (A.32)are monotone increasing functions
of a arid C. For this purpose, I write Vy, V0 andto denote the value of
those variables when a = 0. From (A.32) and(A.36) we have V.0= =
A - Z, which reduces to
Vy0 1Vr[F2 - 2?W0r + Vr(W2 + 2)]
and this is strictly equivalent to equation 1.7bin the text.84 Next, from
(A.32) we have
V == V0 + B + C - (72 -
where from (A.36)
72- 1Vr [2aL(w)(?w - a',-) + a2L2(w)1
hence
VV,V10 + (y.[32V[2jrG(W) + 2o-L(w) + a(w)J
where
4(w) = G(w)vL(w) - L2(w).
But since G(w) and L(w) > 0 for all finitew, and since85 f(w) > 0 for all w
> -, it is apparent that the variance (Vi) isan increasing function of the
penalty costs (a), as was to be shown.86
Moreover, it is again found that the increase in the variance dueto any
positive level of penalty costs progressively increases with the levelof
forward commitments (C) and doesso at an increasing rate until commit-
ments are well in excess of the expected level of investible funds (X). From
(A.40) the increase in variance is






aC 3V C ttV130r
- 2orG(W) - 2cL(w)F(w)J,
Since, from footnote 85,'(w) =2L(w)F(w). Consequently,
= 2OJ3Orif(W) + orG(W) + £L(w)F(w)j > 0
for all finite w. The proof that d2/aC2> 0 as well for all C < X (and
somewhat beyond) follows similarly.87
Finally, to prove that whent7Xr < 0, positive penalty costs on fund
shortfalls will reduce the optimallevel of forward commitments, (A.31)and
(A.40) are differentiated, using(A.37), and the results are substitutedinto
equation 1.4 in the main text.It is thereby found that the optimalforward
commitment position witha > 0 must satisfy




When a0, this expression directly reducesto that for the optimum in the
absence of penaltyCosts (equation 1 .9a), but in view of(A.43) it is apparent
that any positive penaltycosts will reduce the optimalcommitment posi- tion (Ct) and that thereduction becomes progressivelylarger as the penalty cost differentialbecomes larger.
APPENDIX B:8 FURTHERNOTES FOR SECTIONS
2.3 AND 2.4
Note 1
Equation 2.26 (whichignores the addedvariance of V1, inducedat high levels of h by risks offund shortfalls) has theproperties illustrated by the data in column 9 oftables 1 and 2 and bythe solid (variance) linein Figure 3. From (2.26),we find that this varianceof thenew-money rate will decline with increasingforward commitmentpositions as longas
(i) 2thV +) <0 = 2KVr(hKM1) <0













for all h < 1/KM, which surely covers the relevant range of forward
commitment positions. With /3 = 0.2, x0 = 0, and e = 1 (see note to Table
1), we have K1.04166, M1.0133, and 1/KM = 0.947. With these
values, the variance declines with h for all forward commitment positions
up to about 95 percent of expected funds. Increasing x0 to 0.5 reduces K
and increases this figure to 0.957. From equations 2.20 and 2.23, it is also
clear that smaller values of e (and V) would always reduce both K and M
and raise the range still further.
We may also observe that the decline in the variance of the new-money
rate will be more rapid when the commitment premium x0 = (r )is
larger. Note that the derivative of the right side of (2.27) with respect to x0
is = V (4hKM - 1) (KIOx0). Since K and M are both roughly equal to 1 .0,
the entire expression will have the sign of the final derivative for all h
greater than about 0.25; but from (2.20), the latter derivative is clearly
negative, thereby increasing the negative value of the right side of (2.27).
Q.E.D.
Note 2





aB XKM XK3MV. f3 (KM)2, XK'F ia/3
All three terms act to reduce has long asK/O/3 > 0 andKM/äf3 > 0.
Since t3M/8f3 = 2(1 - 2p) /3e22(M - 1)1/3 > 0, andK/3f3 reduces to
(x0 + 2f3Ke)l(1 - j32e2), after reduction
(1/31e2)1i3K/af3 = 2/3e2 - xo(l + 132e2)
and
(1 - /32e2)2aKM/8f3 = 4pf3e2 - xo[3M - M13?e? - 2(1 - f32e2)J
4p/3e2 - x0(1 + 4/3ei.
Both derivatives are positive until x0 reaches significant positive values; but
with even larger commitment premiums, these derivatives will remain
relatively small in absolute size. The full effect of the second and third
terms in equation A will consequently no more than partially offset the
dominant effect of the first term, which (with sign) is inherently negative.
Note 3
In the "investment income" model (equation 1.9a), increasing X reduces
forward commitment positions so long as x0 =- > 0. It wasconcluded





asthat this inverse relationhas held in practicebecause it could beestab- lished that x0 > 0 inpractice throughout theperiod covered by thestudy (see Fleuriet 1975, andLintner, Piper, Fortune1976). In thepresent new-money-rate model, thecorresponding conditionis the somewhat
more stringent requirement that' =- XKVr > 0. (Note that inthe right-hand expressionon the first line of equation2.29a, increasingA reduces the denominatorofiJXV,and so it reduces hif and only if si'> 0.) This differencebetween the modelsin the condition forah4/ak < 0 arises simply becausewhen new-moneyrates (or rates of return)are the criterion of performance,the variable' in equation 2.11 playsthe same role as the variablex0 = --?in the investmentincome model. (Specifically, commitmentsaffect expectedincome () linearly withx0 in equation 1 .6a, whilethe impact of thecommitment ratioon expected rates of return is linearin'in equation 2,19.)
We can assert thatah,'faA < 0 in thenew-money-rate model inpractice because the evidenceclearly indicatesthat v' > 0throughout the period covered by thisstudy. Since,as noted above,x0 has been positiveby significant marginsthroughout the period,and I now showthat' - xo = PKV was very smallin the early1960s and continuedto be relatively small thereafter.In the early andmiddle 1960s,3 < 0.15 (as shownby the long-term regressionfor equation 2.13in Note 4, below).With K approxi- mately 1, /3KV< 3 basis pointswhile x0 at alltimes was substantially larger. In the late1960s, ex anteassessments of /3may have risen toas much as 0.4or 0.5 and Vmay have risen toward1; but since high/3 and x0 imply K < 1,we would have I3KV< 0.5 (and probablyconsiderably lower for mostlenders most of thetime). In anyevent,' > 0, since the commitment premiums(x0) were runningabove 70 basispoints in these years, whileII3KVI< 0.5.
Note 4









































Equation R2 Slope Value tRatio R2 Slope Value £ Ratio
Although both forms explain about 90 percentof the total variance of
fund flows, the t values are somewhat higher inthe latter form. Moreover,
it will be observed that the slope is morenegative in both forms for the
later years alone than for the longer period.This also, and even more
strongly, suggests using the product form /3r; andthe conclusions in the
text follow immediately.
Note 5
For greater generality, instead of (2.26) inthe text, let the variance after
recognizing fund shortage risks be
(2.26b)Vt, = Vr + h2V.42hcrwr + 2f(h)
where f(h) = 0 for all h < h0; but f(h) > 0,f"(h) > 0 and 1' (h) > 0 for all h
> h0. If we also let='o - g(h),g'(h) > 0, to reflect the expectedvalue
of the costs associated with the fund shortages,the optimizing equation
becomes
(2.28b)aW/ah = 0 =- x(aV/ah)/z
=- g'(h) - X[hV + Twr+ f'(h)]
2.13 .92 /3 = .14 4.28 .88 = 0.21 4:16
2.13a .92 b = .91 4.75 .89 b = 1.84 4.63
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The restotthe analysis continues asbefore where this"percent
covariance" h is substituted for /3inall the previous derivations and
discussion. But upon comparing (2. 1 3a) with the original (2.13), it is found
that b/3?; hence, there is an additional multiplicative depressive effect of
the expected level of the interest rate (F) as asserted in the text onthe basis
of this assessment.
The field interviews confirmed that the ex ante variances of the interest
rate had grown larger during the later 1960s roughly in linewith the higher
levels of interest rates, and that managements' assessmentassociated these
deviations in rates with larger percent changes in fund flows, asimplied by
the latter formulation; and the results of econometric testsof the two forms
generally confirmed this preference. Each form was fitted to aggregate
industry data, using quarterly observations for the entireperiod, 1957-
1971, and for the later years, 1965-1971, separately. Aquadratic time
trend was allowed for in each case, and the following results were
obtained:
1957-1971 1965-1971ala.,
instead of (2.28) in the text. When total differentialsare taken, the previous
results for x0 and A are readily established. In thesame way, it can be
shown that previous conclusions withrespect to the sign of dh/dfi con
tinue to hold apart from (undoubtedly exceptional)situations in which
of'(h)/aG is both large and positive.
Note 6
Since the outside sign is negative for S, itsnegative sign can be established
by showing that the bracketed expressionis positive for all relevant values
of the variables. This condition is clearlysatisfied for all p0.25, but the
situation is less obvious for all0.25 < p0.5. Note first that K is
inherently positive and thatwe are only concerned with positive levels of
forward commitments (h); since hand K only appear asa product we write
XhK. Next note that sincejI > 0 for all p <0.25 it willnow suffice to
show that the expression in bracketsdoes not change sign for all0 <p <
0.5. Since Iis a quadratic in X.it can only change signiiit has a
"solution value" of X, Such solutionvalues turn out to be
3± \/3(4p-)f32e2f
3+(l_4p)132e2
With the illustrative valuesof/3 = 0.2,e = 1, andp1/3 in Table 1,S is
negative for all X except 0.95< X < 1.08; and smaller valuesof e (or /3) would further and rapidly reducethe exceptionalrange. (On the other
hand, a p = 0.4 would increasethe range to 0.92 <X < 1.10.)Not only is the exceptionalrange narrow and limited inour model as it stands, it is
obvious without going intomathematical details thatany allowance for the
"costs and risks of shortfalls"in this model (as in section1 .4 for that
simpler model) would addsubstantial amounts ofnegative skewness as X (and h) rose toward unity,thereby insuring that 5,< 0 for all relevant
values of all othervariables.
Returning to the illustrationin Table 1, 1note further that
S, VrGI3hK(1hK)2 + h3K3(14p)fl2e2]
lVr + h2K2VrM- hKVrI"
using (2.21), (2.22), and(2.25)
Gl3hK(1 - hk)2 + h3K3(1- 4p)/32e2J
1(1 - bK)3 + h3K3f33e(1-2p)'l





























final column of the table. With respect to the contrasting pattern of S, itself,
see Note 7.
Note 7
From (2.30a) as it stands, it can be seen that the maximum negative value
of S3, will occur for the value of h that maximizes
3h(1 - hK)2 + h3K2(1 - 4p)$2e
and this occurs when h is about 1/3; and thereafter S, becomes less negative
as h increases. The small second term may be ignored; the derivative of the
first term with h reduces to (1 - 3Kh)(1 - Kh), and since K1, this will be
negative for all h > 1/3 roughly. But since outside the bracket we have A <
0, therefore âS0Ih > 0 for all1 > h > Y3 approximately.
Note 8
Mathematical analysis is nevertheless informative. After multiplying out
(2.38), we find that
D - 2lKVrGAVw(2 - HKh)içb + K4VG2g4?
where
g=4H= 1 +(1 4p)/32e3>O.
When 4) = 0 we have D = A2V > 0, and this quadratic in 4) will not
change its sign so long as b < 4a0c0 lwhere a0 = K4V?G2g; b0
2K2VrGXVw(2 - KHh,'); and c0 = X2VUI. But b < 4 a0creduces by
massive cancellation to (2 - HKh<.g, which in turn (using the
approximate values g - 1, K - 1 and H -3) is satisfied for all h > 0.33.
Consequently, 0 remains positive for all values of 4) so long as the
companies would have had forward commitment positions greater than
roughly one-third of their expected (future) investible fund flows in the
absence of any concern with skewness per se. Not only have forward
commitment positions uniformly exceeded this level in practice, but asI
show in note 9, the observed h's are lower than they would have been in
the absence of dispreference for negative skewness when risks and costs of
fund shortfalls are significantas they are in practice.
Note 9
Rewrite (2.36) using (2.37) as q = (8WI.3h) = ah2 - bh + c; and note that q
is a vertical parabola that is open downward since a < 0 (because 4) > 0
Interest Rate Expectations 505and S, < 0). Max q = c- (b2/4a) > 0 because 0 > ft Max q occurs when
h b/2a(XV- yB)/yS.. On either side of max q, there are tworooc
for which q = 0. The left-handroot (with smaller Ii) is given by h1= (b +
YD)/2a_thjs is the smallerroot because a < 0and the largerroot is h2
= (b - \/D)/2a which is (2.39) in the text. h1 isnot a relevant root,
because at h, the necessary second-orderconditions for a solution of (2.36)
to represent a true maximum of (2J6)are not satisfied, since at this point
=Wih2 = ./D > 0. If the ithcompany's forward commitment
position equals h1, it can increase itsutility level by increasing h; and this
will continue to be trueuntil its h reaches the higher levelgiven by the
right-hand root, h2, shown in (2.39).Moreover, with its forwardcommit-
ment position at this level, the second-orderconditions for a true relative
maximum are satisfied, sincewe then have 3q/ah = a2W/ah2 =- 0, and any furtherIncrease in h beyond this point would reduceits utility level.
APPENDIX C: FURTHER NOTESFOR SECTION 3
Note 1
Rewrite (3.5) as
- k1(Z +S,eZ2/2 az
and note thatq is a vertical parabola whichis open downward, sinceX > a O and 5,,. < 0. Maxq' - (X2V,/2A5) > 0 (since U> 0), and occurs 0 when z = < 0 (since 5, < 0). Oneither side of maxq, there are two roots at q= 0. The left-hand root (with smallerz) is given by z1= (kV, th + Yo)/5,, since S< 0, and the right-handroot is given by (3.7). Atz1, 5' the necessarysecond-order conditions fora solution of (3.5) torepresent a d; true maximum of (3.la)are not satisfied, sinceat this pointqIaz = ch = > 0. When the ithcompany's relative forwardcommit- Wi rnen level is equal toz1, it can increase its utility levelby increasingz; and 0 this will continueto be true untilits z reaches the levelgiven by the in right-hand root, shownin (3.7). Moreover, withits relative forwardcorn- sh mitments at this level,the sccond..orderconditions for a truerelative eq maximum are satisfied,since we then haveaqiaz= 3?Q*1az2-'/o <0. Co
red
as



































',Va,, and Sare independent of z, and h. But asestablish in Note 4
below,(i)all three of these variables are functions of h,when h is
sufficiently large to involve significant costs and risks of lund shortfalls, and
(ii) the properties of these functions are
0V,(h)0 S,(h)<0
"(h)<0V(h)>0 S::h 0
Also note that, with competitors' commitment positions takenas given,
hI3z = 1. Using these relations, we rewrite (3.4)








(3.5b)q(z,) - ='+ z"(h) -AV,z, - (AzV(h)I2)
+(frS,z2)+(z5,(h)/6) = 0.
Explicit solution of (3.5b) is messy, but since'>0, there are meaningful
solutions with z,>0. We have
(3.5c)aq/az, = 2"(h)+z1t"(h) - AV,r - 2Az1V,(h)+
-lAzV(h)/2l+l4z S(h)/2l+lz,S(h)I3I+1z'Sj'(h)/61,
and all terms (with sign) are negative when z,0. III we were to have'<
0, then q(0)<0, and meaningful solutions would also exist with z,<0;
but the commitment position could not be too much smaller than that of
the principal competitors (i.e., z cannot be too large,if negative) since
stable solutions require that aqIaz1<0.1Since Oq/Oz,<0, we can
determine the properties of the solutions.In particular the effects of
changing the value of any variable or parameter for commitment positions
will have the same sign as the derivative of q with respect to that variable.
On this basis, we know that dz1/d'> 0, dz,/dVK0, and dz1fdS,K0. But
in (3.5a'), it is clear that allowance for the added costs and risks of fund
shortages has simultaneously had the effect of algebraically reducing the
equivalent (but fixed) values of' and Swhile raising the equivalent V.
Consequently, allowance for costs and risks of fund shortages concurrently
reduces the otherwise optimal relative forward commitment position (z),
as asserted.
A further comment: we have sign dz/dA = sign lzV-+ 4V',,(h)I2J. In
Note 1,I dealt with the case where V.(h) = 0, and the same "covergent"
conclusion follows since V,(h)0 and z>0 will be increased only so
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long as V+ izV.(h)/21 > 0; otherwise thesituation would beunstable downward.
Note 3
From the preceding note,we have sign dz/d4 = signq!a4 = sign 135k +
z15j,(h)J. SinceS, <0 andS(h)<0, wehavecIztJd <0wheneverz o (i.e., whenever' > 0, as it always has beenin practice). It shouldbe noted, however, thatany z < 0 would be reduced onlyas long as the
expression in brackets remainspositive. Any zless than- 3S/S.ffi) would be increased byan increased dispreference fornegative skewness, with a "stabilizing"movement of z toward zero.
Note 4 (to supportNote 2 above)









where> 0 incorporatethe added costsof a positive intecestrate deviation involvinga fund shortfall. Define
(a (a), =
where'ois the value oft''in equation 2.1la with no allowancefor shortfalls. With theprobability distributionof equation 2.17,it immediately follows that
(2.19b) = t''o - p-q
whereis the value ofgiven by equation2.19 withno allowance for shortfall costs andrisks.

























for the costs and risks of fund shortages. Introducing such shortage costs
makes the covariance of cv andbecome
(2.21a)a,r =- )tw - w) =
- a)1 (x0 + =[
1- ]
+ (1 1 +p
(2.21b)O'Ur = (ffur)o - P1.
Similarly, it can be shown that allowance for the costs of such shortages
makes the variance
(2.22b)V = V+ 2pK[1 + J3(1 - 2p)] + pi2(1 - p).
Finally, upon algebraic calculation, itis found that
(2.22c)S. = E(' -
= S- p[3(1 - 2p)K(C + Z) - - 2p)(1 - p) + p3(l -
where
CeK[(1 + 1)2 - 4pp22l
Z =(1 +E - 2p/3).
The signs asserted in Note 2 for the first and second derivatives of', Vi,,,
andwith respect to h follow from the view of a as a rising function of h
whenever forward commitments (C) are large enough relative to expected
fund inflows (F), or alternatively, whenever h = C/F becomes large enough
to involve a significant chance of fund shortfalls. Indeed, for any given
probability distribution over interest rates (?) and value of the (negative)
covariance /3 between interest rates and funds, larger h positions will
involve greater costs of readjustment and hence greater values of a, and
these costs will increase at an increasing rate with larger values of h. But
a'(h) > 0 and a"(h) > 0 imply 'q'(h) > 0 and"(h) > 0, which n turn by
the negative signs before the additional terms in equations 3.5a', 3.5b, and
3.5c (Note 2 in the appendix) imply the indicated signs of the first two
derivatives on cv,Vi,,, and S.
NOTES
The lender's obligation to provide the funds is legally binding. Although the borrowers
obligation to draw down the funds is not legally enforceable in many cases, there is a
strong presumption and moral obligation on the latter. American Life Insurance Associa-
tion (ALIA) data show that cancellations have been only a small fraction of outstanding
commitments throughout the period since 1961.
This was because of a progressive shift in relative yields. Before the mid-1950s, home
since E() = 0
Interest Rate Expectations 509mortgage yields were unusually 40 basis points higher than those on incomepiopertips
but by the early 1970s, this margin had fallen to a negative 150 basispoints. For hirthpr
discussion, see Lininer, Piper, and Fortune (1976).
Jones (1968), in an earlier study, also undertook to test the extent to whichinsurance
companies had acted on their expectation of future interest rates. He ran regressionsin
which both current and a moving average of past rates (asa proxy for the expectej
future rate) entered along with cash flows, but the resultswere inconclusive and there
was no systematic development of the relevant theory.
The length of the period between commitment andtakedown will, of course, vary with
the type of underlying loan or asset being considered,as previously indicated. Use ot
this single-asset, single-period model facilitates thederivation of interest rate effects and
can be readily generalized to multiple assetsover multiple time periods.
The effects of a "downward.sloping demandcurve" for commitments are introduced in
subsection 1.4, below.
The relevant alternative "5pot" rate will bea government bond rate for savings and loan
associations, a new-Issue corporate rate for insurancecompanies, and either a govern-
ment or corporate rate for mutual savings banks (dependingon their portfolio position
and relative market yields at thetime). Again, the futurity of the relevantspot rate will
depend upon the type of loan involvedin the commitment.
7,Indeed, the field work suggests that,in several important companies at least, thiskind of competitive criterion may well havecome to dominate the earlier concern with absolute
income levels or rates of return themselves.
Or, equivalently, have a preferencefor (positive) skewness, other thingsequal. In our field interviews, lending officerswere quite reluctant to enter into situations
involving better than even chancesof shortfalls from expected valuesunless the expected gain were enough richerto justify the action.
In recent years, amonginsurance companies, there has been increasingemphasis upon comparisons of a company's new-moneyrate with that of its competitors, especiallyin companies heavily involved ingroup insurance.
Equation 1.9 implies C > F for allvalues of r > 1; hut in this limitingcase with the total supply of investible fundstreated as a known constant, itcan be argued that such
an excess of commitments over availablefunds would never occur, i.e., that(1.9) is relevant only in the region C F and r1. Later sections of the paper analyzemore realistic cases free of theserestrictions.
In practice, we observer> ibut as shown laterthisis a consequence of the
uncertainty regarding the volume of fundsavailable for investment and itsnegative covarjance with the future interestrate.
The objective of maximizingincome streams produced by lenders'investments over time, combined with riskaversion in the face of uncertaintyover future alternative interest rates, can readily leadto the choice of a fully investedposture as a n-ionth.to_ month or quarter-toquarter
operating pol'cy. Jones's effort (1968)to distinguish between
"maximizing returns over time" and"lull investment policies"as characterizations of companies' investment objectiveswas consequently unjustified. For furtherdiscussion, see Lintner, Piper, Fortune (1976).
Guy Stevens has shown thatwhen three variables,x, y, and z, are multivariate normal,
the covariance of the product with i is given by letting I = and i = i, we have the equationin the text. See Stevens(1971, PP. 1235-1250, especially page 1240).
Variances must, of course, alwaysbe positive, and itcart be readily established that (1.7b) satisfies thisrequirement in spite of the twoimportant negative terms. Stevens (1971) ha shown that thevariance of the product Ijis given by
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When this expression is substituted into (17b)it is seen that
= 1 + V,V,(1 + p,L
where p'-, is the squared correlation coefficient betweenand i, and
Z C)V, + 2(F - C)io-F, + 12V1 = (F - C)2Vr + 2(F - C)ip,,.o',a, + ?V-,
where if, and OF are the standard deviations of? and F. Now, since p>1, Vy> Z
and Z > [(E - C)o-,. - > 0.
Q.E.D.
See Lintner, Piper, Fortune (1976), where these theoretical results are shown to explain
many of the more significant changes in the forward commitment positions of insurance
companies over the last ten or fifteen years.
It is clear from the structure of the forward commitment decision that the yield on direct
investments cuentIy available in the market affects forward commitment positions only
insofar as it influences management's assessment of the directly relevant expected (but
uncertain) market rate which will be available at time of takedown. Moreover, once
again, even this relevant expected future market rate influences forward commitnient
positions only by way of its yield spread from the rate currently available on forward
commitments.
13.Each of the variables on the right side of equation 1.1 Oa is inherently positive except for
the negative covariance (or regression coefficient) term b., but this negalive element is
reversed by the negative sign before the whole expression.
For simplicity here, I assume some common set of values for all firms in the industry for
all variables except C and F, which are taken as straightforward aggregates of each
lender's expected funds and commitments.
They in the aggregate supply equation will be the harmonic mean of the 'y,'s of the
individual lending institutions even when all assessments are homogeneous. When the
lender's assessments of the expected future market rate and its variance differ, the
corresponding terms in the aggregate supply equation are weighted averages formed as
indicated in lintner (1969).
Development and construction loans are usually advanced by other short-term enders
such as commercial banks, but generally only on the condition that some life insurance
company or othei institutional lender has already made a forward commitment (before
construction has started) to provide the permanent mortgage on the property after its
completion. (This was almost universal practice before the emergence, about 1970, of
the real estate investment trusts (REITs), which began, as a competitive device, to extend
rapidly increasing volumes of new.construction loans without prior takeout commit-
inents; but the consequences of such practices are now clear, and they have been
abandoned.)
It should also be observed that mortgage bankers who specialize in originating loans on
existing properties as well as new construction will usually not assume the risks of
long-term lending. Consequently, they also require forward commitments of permanent
lenders before proceeding.
Although Lane set up his models for short-term commercial bank commitments, his
formal analysis, in which prior commitment of rates, fees, amounts, and takedown time
is assumed, applies equally well to the longer iinancings that are of concern here.
The relationships V_,, = V,,, + V,. - 20',,.,, and oir.,,,-r) = 0',,,r-- V,, are used in
reducing Vto the form shown as equation 1.13.
Fleuriet (1975) compares the average rate on the forward commitments made in each
quarter 1960:2 through 1970:2, as shown in ALIA data, with the expected future rates at
mean takedown time, as estimated by the forward long-term rate implicit in the market
yield curve. (The former series is shown in column 4 of his Table 2, pp. 45-46, and the
latter is given in column 1 of the same table after deducting 1.02 as explained in theI
footnote to the table and his earlier text.) Over this period,the minimum value of ,-
ssas 0.52 percent in 1967:4, and the nlaxirnutii eo,iirsijtnrentpremium was 1.29 in
1970:3. Further evidenc by type of loan and property isgiven in I.intner, Piper, Foilune
(1976).
To simplify the notation the additional subscript fortakedown time has been omittedat this point.
Empirically, the principal source of such shortfallshas been the impact ofunexpectej
increases in market rates, causing investible fundsto he lower than forecast (see tintner,
Piper, Fortune 1976).
This is clearly the economic reality, well-knownand acted upon by investment officers
The bookkeeping conventions used inpublic reports are tied to amortizedhistorical
costs and distinguish capital gains from "income."The "book" income forgone in the
sale of low coupon bonds purchased earliermay thu5 be less than the yield onnew
investments even when the yield atcurrent market values (and a fortiori at the stilllower value realized from any forcedmassive sale) is substantially higher.
A particularly striking instance ofmassive sales by life insurancecompanies from
existing portfolios occurred during the1966 credit crunch. The companies hadnot foreseen the massive decline ininvestible funds, especially from policyloans, and had to cover the gap by sellingsecurities into declining markets, notablyin the second quarter of the year.
If the level of interest rates isnot already relatively high, theresponse of prepayments
and policy loans to changes ininterest rates is likely to be relativelysmall, as explained previously.
The simple additional adjustmentsin the formal model toaccommodate the general aversion to borrowing that showson year-end bal,,nce sheets (or themore relaxed attitudes beginning to be foundin some companies and banks),are not given in the text. For the former land generallystill much the larger)group of lenders, the disutility of added borrowing thatmay not be repaid within the calendaryear is considerably greater than the loss of income landadded variance) involved in theinterest cost of the loan. Our model can easily be adaptedfor such lenders by letting Fhave a value sufficiently higher than the debtcost to reflect the aversion to debtper Se. For the minority of institutional lenders (suchasavings and loan associations; thatare more willing to borrow rather freely toeven out their fund flows over time,we merely need to add a coefficient, a (where 0 <a< 1) before the penalty term (F,- F,) in equation l.5a' to reflect the fact that the expectedlife of the borrowing tocover commitments will only be a fraction of the expected life ofthe loans being bought throughthe commitment process,
It should be emphasized thatthe qualitative conclu5ionsdrawn in the next paragraph continue to hold for bothgroups of lenders; and the conclusionsin the text followingare considerably strengthened for thosewho continue to beaverse to debt per se. It can also be shown that theadditional term in (ISa')introduces "downside skewness" into the distribution of random
investment income () and thatthis negative skewness also increases atan increasing rate as forwardcommitments are raised relativeto expected fund flows. Since thecompanies have a strong dislikeof negative skewnessper se (even when the meansand variances are heldconstant), this skewness effect compounds and strengthens thequalitative conclusions drawnin the immediately following text.
It is not necessary torest the case for finite eiasticit,of demands on deductivelogic: it was brought out in fieldinterviews that there weresubstantial numbers of situationsin which lenders hadwanted to makemore commitments butwere unable to do so without shading theircharges,
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John [intnerIf the demand curve is declining, then the volume of Commitments any company wilt be
able to place (the demand for its funds via commitments) will increase as it 1oers its
rate. Consequently, the greater the volume of'its commitments, the lower will be the
average rate it can get on its commitments. With c > 0, equation 1.18 incorporates
these general relationships in a simple, linear form.
This is most readily seen if rates of return for the continuous compounding equivalent of
the given discrete rates of return, 9, are regarded as being normally distributed. Since i
In (1 + 9), we have ending wealth X = Xoet where X0 is initial wealth.
The power utility function is U(X) = -X(where A > 0), which may readily be shown
to have constant proportional risk aversionp' = -XLJ'(')/U() 1X > 0. Moreover,
E(tJX)I = -X0Ee) and when 2 is normally distributed with mean i and variance V,
the expectations on the right may be evaluated as the -Ath moment in the usual
moment.generatiflg function; hence
E[U(X)) '= -(X) exp f-AllAVj21(
which is monotone increasing in [zXV/2], corresponding to (2.2).
When 9 is the normally distributed rate of return over discrete intervals of time, the
same equation 2.2 is still good to the second order. In that case,
ElU)l = _(XI/Vr) J'(1 + ')exp l-(f /2V! dy
-(Xj/'/2rr) Jexp I-k nit + ?)(y9)'/2V,l dy
But In (1 + 9) = 9 - 92/2 + , and all terms beyond the first will introducethird and
general higher moments into the solution. Consequently, ignoring such higher orders of small-
relaxed ness, we have
the text.
sutility of LIU(X)l = (Xj'/V'i) Jexp (-Af y)1/2V11 dy
dygreater = -(Xjexp{-XlAV,/2l)
Ificiently which is monotone increasing in W as defined in (2.2). Q.E.O.
inority of 36.There is, of course, one special case that is an exception to this general statement.
villing to Specifically, if i in (2.12) has a two-point distribution symmetrical about= 0, then s.'
to add a in (2.11a) will also have a two-point distribution symmetrical about'. However, all
iSa' to more general symmetrical distributions of(including a three- (or more) point distribu-
II only be tion centered on= 0] will yield distributions of' which are asymmetrical about si',
imitment with negative skewness (see footnote 54, below).
37.A is the same measure of (proportional) risk aversionfound in equation 2.2 earlier.
aragraph Arditti (1967, especially pp. 19-21) showed that 4, will beproportional to the ratio of
ewing are the third to the first derivative of U(), and will necessarily be positivefor all investors
se. whose absolute risk aversion declines with the level of their wealth; andthis condition is
ewness" satisfied a fortiori by allinstitutional investors whose proportional risk aversion is
skewness approximately constant. See also Stone (1970, pp. 20-21); Alderferand Bierrnan (1970),
lative to Jean (1971), T5iang (1972), and Kraus and Litzenberger (1972).
ness per 38.The skewness preference parameter 4, must of course be interpretedceteris paribus. To
ss effect illustrate: Consider three distributions of outcomes (Y), denoted A., and C. Let the
ediatety respective means (9) and the variances {V) be the same inall three distributions, but
suppose that S > S> S,. 4, > 0 then indicates that IJ(A) > UW) > U(C), i.e.,
logic: it distribution A is preferred to B, which, in turn, is preferred to C.
ations in 39.These differences in the size of the effect of a change in any stimulusvariable in sections
to do so 1 and 2.2-2.4 reflect the essential linearity of the formermodels and the essential
nonlinearity of the latter due to the presence of Fin the denominator. As specific

















xplainedillustrations, note that investing institutions risk averse to investment incomes will adjust
their forward commitment positions in proportion to any changes in theirassessments of
the difference between commitment rates and the expected future market rate (r-or
to any changes in their assessments of the covariance (o-,,,) between the amount of
funds that will be available for investment and the uncertain market rate. A doublingof
that covariance will lead to twice the reduction in forward commitments; andan
expectation of market rates 50 basis points higher than current commitment rateswill
reduce forward commitments twice as much as an expected spread of only25 basis
points. In contrast, the inherent nonlinearities of the present formulation whenF is
uncertain mean that the reaction will in each case be more for less) than proportionalto
the size of the stimulus change, and this is true whetheror not skewness preferences are
allowed for.
So far asI know, the first recognition of this phenomenon was ina paper by Light
(1968), prepared for Eli Shapiro, which includeda table similar to my Table 1for
comparing the relative new-money rates of a firm thatwas more or less heavily
con'iinitted than its competitors. Since his analysis was confinedto the case where r, = I
in my notation, he did not explore the variationo7 with changes in the size of the
commitment premium, nor did he develop the optimalcommitment positions of
companies concerned with risk-averse maximization of theirown new-money rate.
Evidence for this empirical observation is given in Fleuriet(1975) and in Lintner, Piper,
Fortune (1976). Theoretical proofs that r > 1 isa property of equilibrium in purely
competitive commitment markets (general conclusion iv in theIntroduction) were given
above in section 1.4 (for risk-averse lenders whouse investment income criteria) and in
sections 2.3 and 2.4, below (for risk-averse lenders whouse new-money-rate criteria).
Still another reason for institutional lendersto maintain cornnhitrnent positions is that
Iorsvard commitments improvenew-money-rate performance on average over time (as the
rest o1 my analysis demonstrates). Therefore, lenderswant to maintain supply networks
during fallow periods in order to take betteradvantage of commitment gains when times
improve (see Lintner, Piper, Fortune 1976).
See the discussion accompanying equations2.40-2.42, below. In section 2.4 below, I also
show that, other things equal, forwardcommitment positions will be lower than they
otherwise would have been, thegreater the institutional lenders' dispreference for negative
skewness, as long as demands forcommitments are strong enough (relative to expected
funds, F) to involve at leastsome significant risk of shortfalls.
Subsection 2.2 provided a full analysis whenthe amount of investible funds was not subject
to significant uncertainty.
Gaussian distribution theory is not availablebecause of the random term in the de-
nominatorof(2. 11), and this three-point distributionprovides good closed form expressions
that are quite representative of the resultsobtained with other syrnrrietric distributions(such
as the rectangular) that have been analyzed.
e is measured inthesame unitsasrandForinstance inthenoteto Table 1,e= I whenr =
8.5 (percent). But if the same r had been denoted0.085, then e would have been denoted
0.01. It should also be observed that the product/3 (or /3e) in equation 2.13 isinvariant to this choice of decimal notion:/3 i5 the estimate of the slope coefficientin that Iregression)
equation, and any shift in the decimal placein the data forwill produce an equal and
opposite shift in the measured value of
/3.
The right srdeof(2.25) isgreater than zero because /3and V.are each greater than zero and <M < 2. With our illustrative valuesof/3 = 0.2,p = 'Is, and e = 1, the critical value ofx0














































This is discussed ic section 1.4 above. Since lund shortfalls are not introdu:ed intoequation
2.2', the latter generally declines with h (see Appendix B Now' 1below)
The second.ordercoriditionsfor a unique maximum are satisfied sirue aW/ ah' = -
0.
This optimum forward commitment position based on a mean-variance criterion is iden-
tified asso that it may be contrasted, later, with the corresponding best position after
skewness also is allowed for.
When /3 = O.K1 (by equation 2.20), and hence Owr =Vr, while by (2.22) se then also
have V. = Vr, arid by (2.19), s' == r- r. Inserting these values based on /3 = 0
into (2.29) or (2.29a) gives equation 2:7 exactly. Since the latter equation assumed no
uncertainty regarding investible funds F this result parallels the conclusions reached in
section 1 (compare equations 1 .9 and 1 .9b with b. = 0) where firms were assumed to
be risk averse with respect to levels of investment income (rather than to the rate of
return, as assumed iii this section).
!t was established in the preceding footnote that1 - (f3/X))/KM = 1 when /3 = 0. Note 2 in
Appendix 8 proves that 0h/a/3 < 0. Q.E.D.
To give a simple illustration of the variance effect per Se, suppose that the added risks from
lundshoitfalls add 2dV,/(1 - h)tothevarianceasgiven hy)2.26), where a> 0 ifh >h,
and a = 0 for h < h0. Using a second-order approximation, we then have (2.26a):
V, = hV + 2ho'+ V. 4- 2ah(1 + h)V,.
Use of derivatives of (2.24) and (2.26a) in (2.27) yields an optimum forward commitment
level:
(2.29a)8 =s' - + aV,,)
AV,(1 + 2a)
Observe that hq/äO = --(1 4- 2Ahq)/(1 + 2a) < 0. Sinceh = ht (from 2.29) when a = 0,
and di/ôa< 0 for aUhq> someh0, it follows, as stated, thathqh. In addition, of course,
the lost returns and explicit costs due to the fur.d shortage would further reduce hq by
reducing si'.
Both 5 and S asymptotically approach zero in the limiting case ola symmetrcal two-point
distribution, sinceG = 0 up = 0.5; butwith all three-point distributions (i.e., for allp < 0.5
in (2.17)1 S < 0 as a strict inequality, since the bracketed expression on the right is positive
for all p < (3 + /32e2)/4/32e2. When we substitute the limiting value ofp = 0.5, thebracketed
expression is positive for all /32e2 < 3. Fitted values of /3 empirically are all lessthan
0.3-and even if/3 were taken to be as high as 0.5, the expression would besatisfied as long
as the random deviation le) in interest rates was less than about3.5 percent either way,
which is surely beyond the range of relevance.
Recall the three paragraphs in the text before equation 2.17.
c is written in terms of h-.the optimal forward positionunder our earlier mean-variance
criterion (where it was implicitly assumed that 4, = 0)-in order tofacilitate later compari-
sons with forward commitment positions when 4, > 0, as is nowassumed.
The total differential of (2.36) is
+ 4(8 + h5)(dh 4- (aS/?Jiyi4 = 0.
The stated conclusion follows, because the bracketed term on the left isalmost certainly
negative, since alter substituting (2.22), (2.32ah and (2.33a), wehave
-AV + 4(8 + 85_I = K1VrVAM + 2- #CKHI.
But M> 1 from (223), K < I from (2.20), H> 3 from (2.35),and C > 0 but usually small
from (2.34). The bracketed term consequently reduces to approximately - lAM+ (3h - 2)],
which is necessarily negative for all h > 0.67.
Interest Rate Expectations .515Group insurance is, ofcourse, sold in large blocks withblanket polices coveringlarge numbers of people, and theunderlying contracts are usuallyrewritten at intervals ofone, two, or three years. Thebuyers have a strongincentive to move the businessfrom one company to another on a net-costbasis, and betweenany two companies. theone earning the higher rate ofreturn will generally be ableto provide the insurance ata lower net cost to the buyer. Thecompetitive pressures to showrelatively highernew-money rates have thereby become quitestrong in this part of the insurancebusiness. A rather differenttreatment of the consequencesof relative performancecriteria than that given here will be foundin section Ill of a workingpaper developed independentlyby Light (1973). i-fe focuseson the supply side ofa game-theoretic marketequilibrium with a meanvariance criterion. Thepresent work accounts forimportant skewness preferences but otherwise takesa more standard approach,allowing for demandconstderations in the market at appropriatepoints as well as theimpact of risks of shortfalls. Strictly speaking,my assumption is that the ithinstitution will choose itshon the basis of an assumption that thedistribution of itscompetition's s'is the same as itsown This involves assuming thatE =in equation 2.12 andthat= fin equation 2.13. To develop most ofthe structure andproperties of this modelmost simply. I assume that si',V,, and are given by theinstitution's underlyingassessments and market conditions independentof its owncommitment level. The addedcomplexity introduced by risks and Costsof potential fundshortfalls whencommitment levels wouldotherwise be high areintroduced later.
Indeed, equation2.33a did not allowfor the effects ofshortfalls,I show below that allowance for thecosts conditionallyassociated with suchshortfalls necessarilyand rapidly increases thenegative value of S,,with larger valuesof forwardcommitments relative o expectedavailable funds.
In addition, as isobserved in Note3 of Appendix 8,s' has in fact been positiveduring the entire periodcovered by this study.In order to bringOut more clearly andexplicitly the interplay ofthe forces at workin institutionaldecision making underthis relative performance criterion(and the marketsvide
responses at relevant points),in what follows I work throughthe policy inferencesof assumedcircumstances where' = 0 as well as the more realistically
relevant situationsin which' > 0. From the right sideof (3.7) we havez <0; and therefore,hf' <h0 ii and onlyif /O < xV, which istrue if and only if2s'4)S < 0 (asseen by squaring bothterms and canceling). But since4 < 0 and 5,,, < 0, the
latter condition issatisfied if and only if' <0.
Allowance is ofcourse made here for theobserved negativecovariance betweeninterest rate changes andamounts of investiblefunds. The proof is theconverse of that givenin footnote 64. From equation2.19, we haveaw/ax0 = 1; and fromNote 1 of AppendixC. (aq/az)dz + 0; but aq/az= 'JO < 0; hence,that az/ax0= (a/ax0)I'JO > 0.Q.E.D.
To prove,use the right-hand sideof (3,7) andwrite 'Jo for thefirst term. Then thesign
o1az/ax = the signof I(xVJv'D)- 1). From (3.7), thecondition z <0requires 'Jo
< Ay,,,; hence, thesign of aziax is
positive. Correspondingly,i > 0 requires 'Jo>
XV,,,; hence, thesign of azioxis negative. (Seealso the finalparagraph in Note 3of
Appendix C.)
It is obvmus that
an allowance forpenalty costs thatincreases with thesize of the
shortfall wouldmerely reinforcethese conclusions. (Alla) and (A.1ib) followimmediately fromthe relation vdF(v)f2nY°5edz after
substituting zv2/2. Similarly,
tA.12)(A.14) can bereadily establishedusing integra-
tion by parts.Note that eachpair of the above
truncated momentssatisfies the
well-known valuesfor the untruncated













































(A14c) v¼1F(v) = 3.
71.For the final form of (A.17), notethat(v - u)dF(v) = -flu) - uF(u), using (A.1 lb)
and (A.8); and this reduces to LI-u)after substituting (A.9), (AlO), and (AJ5).
72This follows since> 0 while LI-u)> 0 for all u <and in particular it follows from
equation A.5 for all finite C > 0.
73.LetY = Y(a > 0) andY0 = Ya = 0).Then "s =-coaxL(u),and using (AS) and
(A.15), the absolute reduction inY increases with C, since
aaoxL(-u)/Caoxll - C(u)tduIdC = aF(u) > 0
for au > -. The absolutereduction increases at an increasing rate for all finite C,
since F'(u) = flu) > 0 forall u < -.
74.From (A19) and (A.20), we have
H H = 2i1(1 + u2)F(u) + uftu) -uL)-u)l + a[(l1- uF(u)- uftu) - L9-uH.
To simplify this, note thatif (A.I0) and (A15) are used:
ul(u) - uL(-u)u{f(u) -u - [1(u) - uC(u)l}
= _u*fl - C(u)l =
Also,
uI(u) - L2(-u)uI(u) - lu + E(u)IL(-u)
uI(u) - uL(-u) - L(u)L(-u)
(iii) = -u'F(u)t(u)L(-u).
The substitution of (ii) and (iii) directly into(i) reduces H to equation A.22 inthe text.
75.From footnote 15, and writing X inplace of F, we have that Virri reduces toV,cVr + F 2 Vr
when axr = 0. Note that (1 .7b) isequivalent to (A.22) with a = 0.
76.Write H = 21F(u) + ah(u), where h(u) =F(u) - I(u)L(-u). We have H > 0for all C0
because F(u) > 0 and h(u) > 0 forall u > -c and a fortiori (by equationA.5) for all C
0. F(u)> 0 for finite u by definition.
CorrespondinglY. h(u) > Ofor all u > -because u
> -and h(u) - 0 as u
h(u) = F(u) - uL(u) - L2(u). Hence,h'W) = f(u) -L(u) + uG(u) +2L(u)G(u), and so
(after using A.1O). h'(u) = 2[uC(u) +L(u)C(u)l = 2C(u)L(-ti) > 0for all u > .
Since urn F(u) = 0, we have limh(u) =0 if urn L(u)L(U) = urn L(u)L(-u)0. Out
L(u)L(-u)uL(u)L2(u) and by series expansions itis readily shown that as u -o, lim
L(u) = 0, lim uL(u) = 0 and limL2(i,) = 0. Q.E.O.
77.Indeed, since it was established in the
preceding footnote that H(u) > 0for all finite u.
the variance increases at an increasingrate with the penalty costs a.
78.By (A.22) the increase in variance isaVxH,and aHIaC = (aHlau)(duIdC) =aH1aCXII
or). Consequently, aaVxH/aCaox(21f(U)+ ah'(u)l, and both termsin the bracket are
greater than zero for all u > -by the previous footnote.Similarly, a aVxH1aC2 =
aj2if'(u)ah(u)l > 0 for all finite u0 and all CX, sincef'(u) = -uf(u)>0 for all
finite u < 0 and h(u) = 2lC(u)F(U)f(u)L(-U)1 > 0 for all -< u < +0.3.
(Interestingly, this same expression arosein Lintner976, where values areshown for
various values in the range -3.0 < u< 1.5 in Table B),Appendix B.)
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79.The inverse relation ofand a follows from the relationships $ > 0, a-,> 0, and L(w)>
0 (or all w <, and hence for ai( finite commitment positions (C) after using A.6L
(A.25), and (A.26).
80.The redu:tiori in Y is /3o-,L(w( and 8()IitC = $ur!.'(w((dwIdrr)(thjdC). Butdw/drr
o-by (Al,), anddr./dC = since (A.25) and (A.26) imply thatr,(K - C)/.
Since L'(w)= -Civ),we consequently have a()/OC = C(w) > 0 for all sv >-sand
hence for all finite C.
81. A (r-i)7i2dF(r)p2v,1(w - m)2(i + mcr,(tdF(m) using tAb)
= A + A2 + A3
where
A1 = 2V,121w2 - 2mwm2F(m) V,? t(wt + t)
A = 2$2V,iJ1w2 - 2mw + mtlmdFtm) = 4iwa-
and
A3= )w2 -2mw + m1)m'dF)rn) = 'V.(w2 + 3)
after using (A.11c)(A.14c), as appropriate.
82. B2aJ ir,. - r)2rdF(rJ2a,B1Vf 1w -. m)21i + ma-,JdF(m)
= B +
where
B = 2a,B2iVrr (w - 2mw + m2)dF(m)




2afl2a-2,t(w2m- 2,n2w + m3)dF(m)
= 2a$3o. (w'I(w)2wlw((w) 4- C(wjl + (w + 2)u(w)) using (A.t la,-(A 13a( = 4afl2u3 L(w)
using (A.1O).
C = U2182V,)r,. - ri2V, f' )w - m(2dFiii)
= aV,lw1C)w) - 2w1(w) + wow) + C(wlj
a22V,(Gtw) - wt(w))
After substituting from footnote24, equation1 .7b was
(C22CJ)V,. - 2C?a-,. + V,V + a-L+ i2Vr +2v, + 2?Xa-r, = (C - X)2V, + 2C),. 4- V,V +, +
But from (A.25) we have V$V,., and using (A.29) and (A.30)we find
V./32wV,. - 28wra-3,+
which isthe same as (A.37).
For proof, from (A.41) let
4(w)C(is) - wL)w) - t'(rv)
= -1(w) - ((w( + wC(iy)- 2L (wIG 1w)
21(w( + 2L)wytw)
2t(w)F(w) <0
using (A.9(, (A.1 la), (A.12a(






for all w < .But as w -'
urn(w) = jim C(w)urn wLtw = jim Ltlw)0.
jAs , urn wL(w) =Urn wf(w) = jim w'G(w)0 as may be confirmed by series
expansion.l We thus have(w) > 0 for all finite w since 4'(w) < 0 throughout while as
w - lim 41w)0.
indeed, since 4(wl > 0 for all finite w, Vincreases at an increasing rate with larger
penalty costs (a).
We have
at/aC201ywf(wI -J(w) + aL(w)f(w) - aG(w)F(w)l
(A.43') = 2a1(iw + n,)u(w) + aw(w))
where wtw) = C(w)F(w) - f(w)L(w) >0 for all -0.37 < w < cas shown in Lintner
(1976, Table 131, coi. 4). The conclusionin the text follows because C < X as w > 0
from (A.30), and the first termof (A.43') is > 0 for all w > cr,!?.
I wish to express my appreciation toStephen S. Smith for checking the niathematical
derivations in appendixes B and C.Any errors are of course my own.
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